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The Machine as Author
Daniel J. Gervais, PhD*
ABSTRACT: The use of Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) machines using deep
learning neural networks to create material that facially looks like it should
be protected by copyright is growing exponentially. From articles in national
news media to music, film, poetry and painting, AI machines create material
that has economic value and that competes with productions of human
authors. The Article reviews both normative and doctrinal arguments for and
against the protection by copyright of literary and artistic productions made
by AI machines. The Article finds that the arguments in favor of protection
are flawed and unconvincing and that a proper analysis of the history,
purpose, and major doctrines of copyright law all lead to the conclusion that
productions that do not result from human creative choices belong to the
public domain. The Article proposes a test to determine which productions
should be protected, including in case of collaboration between human and
machine. Finally, the Article applies the proposed test to three specific fact
patterns to illustrate its application.
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“Machines don’t own what they make.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

What if the robots took over the set, and then wrote and produced the
next episode of Westworld?2 Is this science-fiction? Well, yes. For now. But
closing the gap between fiction and reality is only a matter of time because
algorithmic creation is here.3

1.
See Jonathan R. Tung, Who Owns the Creation of an Artificial Intelligence?, TECHNOLOGIST
(Aug. 22, 2016, 11:57 AM), https://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2016/08/who-owns-thecreation-of-an-artificial-intelligence.html [perma.cc/WB5H-7RE7] (emphasis added).
2. For the reader who may not be familiar with this (Westworld) television series—the first
season of which was broadcast in 2016—Westworld is a “Wild West” amusement park populated
by robots, called “hosts.” Human guests indulge their wildest fantasies with the hosts, including
shooting them. The robots cannot harm humans. That is, until (spoiler alert) robots become
aware, and revolt. A motion picture with the same title was produced in 1973. See Westworld
(1973), IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0070909 [https://perma.cc/JM6E-4AZS];
Westworld, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0475784 [https://perma.cc/Q3YS-VRU8].
3. See Annemarie Bridy, The Evolution of Authorship: Work Made by Code, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 395, 397–98 (2016) [hereinafter Bridy, Evolution] (describing algorithmic creation); see also
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In December 2016, an artificial intelligence (“AI”) system—what this
Article refers to as an “AI machine”—composed polyphonic baroque music
bearing the “style” of Johann Sebastian Bach.4 So-called “robot reporters”
routinely write news bulletins and sports reports, a process called “automated
journalism.”5 Machines write poems that many people believe were written by
a human author.6 Machines draft contracts.7 A machine named e-David
produces paintings using a complex visual optimization algorithm that
“takes pictures with its camera and draws original paintings from these
photographs.”8 Machines can write scenes of animation movies and improve
the design of objects and processes, thus generating outputs that would, were

Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 5, 5–6 [hereinafter Bridy, Coding] (“[A]ll creativity is inherently algorithmic . . . .”).
4. This Article uses “machine” as a generic term that may apply to a computer using
Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) software but could also cover machines capable of movement such
as a robot painting on canvas.
On the topic of machines composing music, see generally Gaëtan Hadjeres & François
Pachet, DeepBach: A Steerable Model for Bach Chorales Generation (Dec. 3, 2016), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01010v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JYM-8BY3] (explaining a new AI model
that can produce “highly convincing” chorales in the style J.S. Bach’s “four-part harmony with
characteristic rhythmic patterns and typical melodic movements to produce musical phrases
which begin, evolve and end (cadences) in a harmonious way”); and William T. Ralston, Copyright
in Computer-Composed Music: HAL Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281 (2005).
5. See Corinna Underwood, Automated Journalism—AI Applications at New York Times, Reuters,
and Other Media Giants, EMERJ, https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/automated-journalismapplications [https://perma.cc/FZ7E-5EFJ] (last updated Nov. 17, 2019). The Washington
Post’s robot reporter reportedly published 850 articles from September 2016 to September 2017,
including 300 on the Olympic Games held in Rio de Janeiro. See Lucia Moses, The Washington
Post’s Robot Reporter Has Published 850 Articles in the Past Year, DIGIDAY (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://digiday.com/media/washington-posts-robot-reporter-published-500-articles-last-year
[https://perma.cc/2TC4-MDWN]; see also Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for
Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 257 (2016) (“Artificial intelligence is
increasingly prominent in journalism.”).
6. See Samuel Gibbs, Google AI Project Writes Poetry Which Could Make a Vogon Proud,
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/
17/googles-ai-write-poetry-stark-dramatic-vogons [https://perma.cc/NWA5-58N5] (“The
researchers fed the system starting and ending sentences and then asked it to fill in the gap.
. . . The generated sentences make grammatical sense, maintain a sort of theme and for the most
part fit with the start and end sentence. Others weren’t quite as poetic, but still maintain the
theme set by the start and ending sentences.”).
7. See generally Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated Contract Drafting:
Machine Learning Breathes New Life into a Decades-Old Promise, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 216 (2017)
(discussing the advances in contract drafting software and the use of AI in that context).
8. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and
Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New Model, 2017 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 659, 662.
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it not for their machine parentage, qualify as subject matter for a copyright or
even a patent.9 Machines can even write or enhance their own code.10
General Adversarial Networks (“GAN”s) are perhaps the most promising
deployment of machine creativity, the technological path most likely to
grow the affordances of AI machines in this field both qualitatively and
quantitatively.11 “GANs’ potential . . . is huge, because they can learn to mimic
any distribution of data. That is, GANs can be taught to create worlds eerily

9. This Article focuses on copyright but a number of conclusions it reaches could be
applicable to patents, even though patent law has a number of different doctrinal tracks (for
example, the mental steps analysis applied by the Supreme Court of the United States in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 218–27 (2014)). See Ben Hattenbach & Gavin
Snyder, Rethinking the Mental Steps Doctrine and Other Barriers to Patentability of Artificial Intelligence,
19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2018) (“[C]ourts in the aftermath of Alice have
revived the ‘mental steps’ doctrine as a primary yardstick for assessing patent-eligibility. Under
this doctrine, if method claims can be characterized as able to be performed within the mind of
a human being . . . a presumption of patent-ineligibility attaches.”). The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit noted “that processes that automate tasks that humans are capable of performing
are patent eligible if properly claimed.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For a discussion, see Mizuki Hashiguchi, The Global Artificial
Intelligence Revolution Challenges Patent Eligibility Laws, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 11–13 (2017).
Then, as with copyright, the basic normative argument that society benefits from
inventions whether generated by humans or machine has also been made. See Ben Hattenbach &
Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
32, 50–51 (2015) (arguing that “[c]ompanies that invent [using AI] arguably accelerate inventive
activity, and that acceleration is, in and of itself, the type of innovation that society should desire
to—and already does—reward with patents”). See generally IPROVA, https://iprova.com [https://
perma.cc/PC29-Q4WD] (promoting AI technologies that purport “to augment human
intelligence, allowing [users] to create commercially relevant inventions at high speed and with
great diversity”).
10. See Michael Grothaus, An AI Can Now Write Its Own Code, FAST CO. (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40564859/an-ai-can-now-write-its-own-code [https://perma.cc/
BW9E-6UZF] (describing how a new app called Bayou “studies all the code posted on GitHub
and uses that to write its own code. Using a process called neural sketch learning, the AI reads all
the code and then associates an ‘intent’ behind each.”).
11. Indeed, Yann LeCun, Facebook’s AI Research Director and a professor at NYU,
described GANs as “the most interesting idea in the last 10 years in [machine learning].” Yann
LeCun, What Are Some Recent and Potentially Upcoming Breakthroughs In Deep Learning?, QUORA (July
28, 2016), https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-recent-and-potentially-upcoming-breakthroughsin-deep-learning [https://perma.cc/FTL8-XMRS]. GANs emerged in a paper written by a group
of Montreal-based scientists in 2014. See IAN J. GOODFELLOW ET AL., GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL
NETS 1–2 (June 10, 2014), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.2661.pdf [https://perma.cc/
28KW-2VX9]. GANs are “adversarial” because two machines work one against the other, creating
a constant feedback loop that increases the quality of outputs. See Chris Nicholson, A.I. Wiki: A
Beginner’s Guide to Generative Adversarial Networks (GANS), PATHMIND [hereinafter Beginner’s Guide],
https://skymind.ai/wiki/generative-adversarial-network-gan [https://perma.cc/8B2D-G9KA] .
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similar to our own in any domain: images, music, speech, prose.”12 A painting
produced by a GAN was sold at auction in October 2018 for $432,500.13
In short, machines are increasingly good at emulating humans and laying
siege to what has been a strictly human outpost: intellectual creativity.14 At this
juncture, we cannot know with certainty how high machines will reach on the
creativity ladder when compared to, or measured against, their human
counterparts, but we do know this. They are far enough already to force us to
ask a genuinely hard and complex question, one that intellectual property
(“IP”) scholars and courts will need to answer soon; namely, whether
copyrights should be granted to productions made not by humans but by
machines.15 This Article’s specific objective is to answer the question of
whether autonomously created AI machine productions in the literary and
artistic field (that is, prima facie copyrightable subject matter) should be
protected by copyright.
To answer this question, an understanding of the process by which AI
machines create productions of the type that copyright law protects is useful.
For the purposes of this Article, this process consists of three main steps. First,
AI code is written. This code, as technology stands now, is mainly the work
of human programmers.16 The code empowers the second step: “machinelearning.”17 For example, a machine can be shown hundreds or thousands of
12. Id. More specifically, GANs use an actor-critic model, as one machine, “called the
generator, generates new data instances, while the other, the discriminator, evaluates them for
authenticity; i.e. the discriminator decides whether each instance of data that it reviews belongs
to the actual training dataset or not.” Id.
13. James Vincent, Christie’s Sells its First AI Portrait for $432,500, Beating Estimates of
$10,000, VERGE (Oct. 25, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/25/18023266/
ai-art-portrait-christies-obvious-sold [https://perma.cc/KY28-48YC].
14. We have traveled far from the “Greek myths of Hephaestus, the blacksmith who
manufactured mechanical servants, and the bronze man Talos [which both] incorporate[d] the
idea of intelligent robots.” A Brief History of AI, AITOPICS, https://aitopics.org/misc/brief-history
[https://perma.cc//Y4HE-L6T7].
15. This Article uses the neutral term “production,” which only means something that did
not exist and now does, without prejudging its status as a copyrighted work or a patentable
invention. See Produce, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007), https://www.oed.com/
view/Entry/151978?result=2&rskey=BH9azF& [https://perma.cc/X47Q-ARK2] (“To bring into
being or existence. . . . To bring (a thing) into existence from its raw materials or elements, or as
the result of a process; to give rise to, bring about, effect, cause, make (an action, condition,
etc.).”).
Answering whether copyrights should be granted to productions made by machines in
the affirmative would mean answering a follow-up question; namely, in which “person” should
the rights vest? Not to the AI machine, at least not for now. In Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418, 420
(9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit decided that a monkey had no legal standing to claim
copyright. It is hard to see how a software program or machine could.
16. Though that may soon change. See Grothaus, supra note 10.
17. See Roberto Iriondo, Machine Learning vs. AI, Important Differences Between Them, DATA
DRIVEN I NVESTOR, https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/differences-between-ai-andmachine-learning-and-why-it-matters-1255b182fc6 [https://perma.cc/7YKL-44S5] (last updated
Aug. 23, 2019) (“‘Machine learning [ML] is the study of computer algorithms that allow
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pictures of (human-identified) cats and dogs and then learn the features of
each species by detecting patterns and correlations, which then enables the
machine to recognize cats and dogs it has not been shown before.18 A subset
of machine learning known as “deep learning” uses a layered structure of
algorithms that allows the machine to learn and make decisions on its own.19
Though deep learning technology initially fell short of delivering on its
early promises, “the concurrent development of novel algorithmic training
protocols . . . , the access to an unprecedented amount of computational
power and the accumulation of large quantities of digitised training data”
have radically changed this outlook.20 With deep learning, one could say that
the computer “has its own brain.”21 Importantly for the purposes of this
Article, deep learning is automated and often removed from direct human

computer programs to automatically improve through experience.’—ML [is] one of the ways we
expect to achieve AI. Machine learning relies on working with small to large data-sets by
examining and comparing the data to find common patterns and explore nuances.”).
18. See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 592 (2018) (discussing the importance of good training data and
the risk that providing the system with too many examples of similar-looking cats would lead the
system to make mistakes).
Machine learning does not always require direct human training, as machines can learn
in autonomous (or “unsupervised”) mode. See JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 72 (2019) (“A particularly vivid example of unsupervised learning was
a program that, after being exposed to the entire YouTube library, was able to recognise images
of cat faces, despite the data being unlabelled.”).
19. See Robert D. Hof, Deep Learning, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 23, 2013), https://
www.technologyreview.com/s/513696/deep-learning [https://perma.cc/B5P4-K3UZ] (“Deeplearning software attempts to mimic the activity in layers of neurons in the neocortex, the wrinkly
80 percent of the brain where thinking occurs. The software learns, in a very real sense, to
recognize patterns in digital representations of sounds, images, and other data.”).
A well-known instantiation of deep learning is the use of AI to micro-target individuals
and “consumer propensity” via social media. See Y. Tony Yang & Brian Chen, Legal Considerations
for Social Media Marketing by Pharmaceutical Industry, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 39, 39 (2014) (“Given
the ability to individualize messages, target specific groups, interact in real time with potential
consumers, and the potential benefits of instantaneous referrals among trusted individuals, the
surge in interest in social media advertising is far from surprising.”).
Note also the risk of anthropomorphic framing here suggested by the use of the term
“learning.” Humans are more likely to consider the machine as performing a “human task” if we
name that task using human terms. In an experiment, participants were much more hesitant to
destroy a robot after being told its name was Frank and being provided a bit of “personal history”
about the robot. See Kate Darling, ‘Who’s Johnny?’ Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot
Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0, at 170, 181 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2017).
20. Jean-Marc Deltorn & Franck Macrez, Authorship in the Age of Machine Learning and
Artificial Intelligence 4–5 (Ctr. for Int’l Intellectual Prop. Studies, Research Paper No. 2018-10,
2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3261329 [https://perma.cc/QY7S-QXQM].
21. See Brett Grossfeld, Deep Learning vs Machine Learning: A Simple Way to Understand the
Difference, ZENDESK (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.zendesk.com/blog/machine-learning-anddeep-learning [https://perma.cc/V84F-WN5Z]. This reminds one of David Nimmer’s quip that
“electronic brains are posing new challenges for biological brains to unravel.” David Nimmer,
Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (1996).
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input.22 Any human contribution to the output of a deep learning process is
thus at least one degree removed from the human programmer(s) of the AI
code. This separation directly challenges a core notion of copyright law,
namely authorship: Who is the author of the (unpredictable) outputs created
by a (deep learning) AI machine?
The third and final step in the process is the production by the machine
of an output, which, for the purposes of this analysis, may facially belong to
one of the categories of literary and artistic objects that copyright law protects,
such as a text or an image.23 To produce this type of output, AI machines can
use a data corpus containing potentially tens of thousands of existing
copyrighted works. For example, an AI machine using a corpus of pop music
can find correlations among the various songs and identify the elements
(melody, harmony, pitch, etc.) that may be causing a song to be popular and
then use this knowledge to write its own potential hit.24 In such a scenario, it
is but fiction to see a human author as being responsible for—or the owner
of rights in—the creation, because the AI machine uses its own insights to
create.25 Even if the human programmer is considered the machine’s master
because she can switch it off or alter its code, is the master truly the author of
the pupil’s creation?

22. This technology has now gone mainstream. Microsoft introduced a fully automated
platform, called Microsoft Custom Vision Services, to process images. See William Vorhies,
Automated Deep Learning—So Simple Anyone Can Do It, DATA SCI. CENT. (Apr. 10, 2018, 8:18 AM),
https://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/automated-deep-learning-so-simple-anyone-cando-it [https://perma.cc/XY5D-U3HK] (discussing the general public availability of Microsoft
Custom Vision Services).
23. Copyright subsists “in original works of authorship.” See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)
(2012). Works typically belong to one of the listed categories: “(1) literary works; (2) musical
works . . . ; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” Id. § 102(a)(1)–(8).
There is no official definition of the term “Big Data.” Some scholars have argued that
“Big Data is less about data that is big than it is about a capacity to search, aggregate, and crossreference large data sets.” danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 (2012).
There is consensus on the fact that the size and depth of the corpus (or dataset) matters at least
up to a point. See Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
859, 867–70 (2016).
24. AI machines used in a laboratory funded by Sony called Flowmachines have produced
a number of “pop” songs, including “Daddy’s Car” composed “in the style of The Beatles,”
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSHZ_b05W7o [https://perma.cc/BKP4-UA
UL]. For a description of the process, see Dani Deahl, How AI-Generated Music Is Changing The Way
Hits Are Made, VERGE (Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/31/
17777008/artificial-intelligence-taryn-southern-amper-music [https://perma.cc/NR2E-G5X3];
and Lucy Jordan, Inside the Lab That’s Producing the First AI-Generated Pop Album, SEEKER (Apr. 13,
2017), https://www.seeker.com/tech/artificial-intelligence/inside-flow-machines-the-lab-thatscomposing-the-first-ai-generated-pop-album [https://perma.cc/6KVR-KMXZ].
25. Though, in the case of pop music, only with limited success (thus far). See Deahl, supra
note 24.
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Clearly, AI machines can generate value, and this value is likely to
increase over time as deep learning processes become more sophisticated.
Who then, if anyone, can and should capture this value, and how? For
example, if an AI machine using a corpus of copyrighted works (say all novels
published in the last 70 years) were able to write fiction that it is attractive
enough to reach an audience willing to pay, it would be natural for the
programmer, owner or user of the machine to try to protect this value in
every possible way, including by copyright law, technological measures and
contract.26 By the same token, we can expect competitors and the public to
try to access and possibly reuse those productions for free or with as few
restrictions as possible.
The potential creation of massive amounts of new literary and artistic
productions by machines without direct human input may create value in
some areas, but it will pose risks in others, not the least of which is to the
future of human creativity. The use of machines to produce various types of
mostly “low creativity” literary and artistic material has already begun to
challenge human-created works in the marketplace.27 Will there still be room
for professional creators? Only time will tell, but a world without professional
writers, journalists and other creators would be poorer.28
This Article believes that both art in myriad forms and quality journalism
have had and should continue to have a role in helping humans understand
and better their world, and that they are necessary for a fully engaged polity.29
26. A period of 70 years was chosen for this example because the principal term of
protection of copyright is the life of the author plus 70 years thereafter, meaning that a corpus
of all books published in the last 70 years (under 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)) would contain mostly, if
not exclusively, works still protected by copyright. This is meant to point to a subsidiary question
not addressed in this paper, namely whether the authors or owners of those works should be
compensated for, or even have a right to prohibit, the mining of such works.
The Second Circuit’s opinion in the Google Books case provides a negative answer, at
least for the mining part, though it did not set boundaries (if any) for the commercial
exploitation of the mined data. See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir.
2015), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1658 (2016) (finding that Google’s scan of millions of in-copyright
books in their entirety (unquestionably a prima facie infringement of the right of reproduction
under copyright law) to make them text-searchable online was a fair use).
27. See Jared Vasconcellos Grubow, Note, O.K. Computer: The Devolution of Human Creativity
and Granting Musical Copyrights to Artificially Intelligent Joint Authors, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 387, 419,
423–24 (2018) (arguing that “the promotion of progress is best served by giving AIs rights and
regulating them” and suggesting that “the U.S. Copyright Office remove[] the barriers for AI
joint authorship” and that a Collective AI Rights Organization (“CAIRO”) should be created to
manage a standard fee (set by law) for the use of AI created music).
28. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE LAW OF HUMAN PROGRESS 24 (2018) (“The decrease of the
signal to noise ratio has two major consequences. First, the mimetic and epistemological signals
that current generations are sending to the next ones are getting weaker; second, the intellectual
toolset we have to understand our world is getting both rougher and poorer.”).
29. The term “quality” is used here not to denote any artistic or aesthetic “merit” but rather
works that inform the capacity to build and share a richer understanding of the world, based on
the assumption that a less nuanced and sophisticated agent makes for less nuanced and
sophisticated agency, and thus a less sophisticated polity. If art, literature, and journalism are
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The presence of art and journalism capable of playing this type of cultural
and political role may be the difference between a future of change (a
difference between points A and B on a timeline) and one of progress (an
improvement at point B).30 Using (admittedly rather loosely) Shannon’s
information theory, if more of the new material made available to read, listen
to and watch is of poor quality, it becomes the equivalent intellectual of
“noise” (an intended double entendre in the music sphere), that is, material
without its intellectually transformative ability. This, in turn, significantly
reduces the signal to noise ratio and diminishes the quality of the
epistemological and cultural signals that current generations send to future
ones.31 This belief is directly relevant to this Article’s analysis because
copyright is meant to create incentives, and creating incentives for machine
productions may mean fewer human ones.
The idea that incentives are meant to lead to human progress is deeply
anchored in American history. The Constitution provides that copyright is
predicated on its ability to produce incentives “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”32 Would providing copyright protection to machine
productions promote Progress? Put differently, if there are more machine
productions—bearing in mind that such productions are likely to reach
higher on the creativity ladder in the near future—will this be an
improvement over the current situation, that is, will there be progress? While a
full discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper—though not
beyond the reach of policy levers33—this Article reflects this belief that human
progress should serve as a normative guidepost.
impoverished, then that capacity is diminished. Martha Nussbaum might agree. She argued that
“[l]iterature widens our experience and expands our moral imagination. It gives us the
opportunity to vicariously explore seemingly infinite instances of lived practical reason.” Ana
Sandoiu, Martha Nussbaum on Emotions, Ethics, and Literature, PARTIALLY EXAMINED LIFE (Aug. 12,
2016), https://partiallyexaminedlife.com/2016/08/12/martha-nussbaum-on-emotions-ethicsand-literature [https://perma.cc/J3QS-3JR6] (discussing Nussbaum’s essay Finely Aware and
Richly Responsible).
Quality is also the term used in JULIA CAGÉ, SAVING THE MEDIA: CAPITALISM,
CROWDFUNDING, AND DEMOCRACY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2016) (explaining the economics
and history of the media crisis and presenting a new business model: a nonprofit media
organization as a possible solution).
30. See id. at 31–32 (discussing “quality news” and noting “[p]rint journalists have been
replaced by computer specialists . . . who are given no opportunity to leave their screens to do
shoe-leather reporting. . . . Newspapers have closed foreign news bureaus, laid off veteran
correspondents, and cut back on local and national political coverage. . . . In the United States,
it has become harder and harder to find news about politics at the state level, where corruption
is rampant, and local newspapers used to serve as a much-needed countervailing power”).
31. See JOHN R. PIERCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION THEORY: SYMBOLS, SIGNALS AND
NOISE 148–72 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that errors can occur because of the admixture of noise in
a signal).
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
33. New or stronger policies could be adopted to support human-created art and
journalism, for example. Though that is certainly a debate worth having, this Article focus on the
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One can posit that machines programmed to produce new literary and
artistic productions need no economic incentive to do so, unlike human
authors who are trying to live from their craft.34 As the epigram suggests,
machines just run their code. That code is protected by copyright, which can
be seen as an incentive for (human) programmers.35 Should the law provide
additional incentives (via copyright law) for machines to execute their code?36
The answer, in this Article’s view, is negative. Specifically, this Article argues
for the proposition that machine productions are not protectible by copyright
once the machine has crossed what this Article calls the autonomy threshold
and is no longer a tool in the user’s hands or a reflection of its (human-made)
program. This Article also suggests an appropriate test to implement the
proposed principle. This Article acknowledges that, whichever solution is
ultimately adopted by courts (or Congress), there will be crucial border
definition issues, including productions created jointly by machine and
human, and this Article thus suggests an analytical approach to parse such

former issue, and tries to answer the question whether machine productions are (doctrinally) or
should be (normatively) protected by copyright.
34. See Robert Yu, The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection Is Appropriate for Fully
Independent Computer-Generated Works?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1264 (2017) (“[A]llocating the
copyright to the programmer would create few additional incentives for other programmers to
code programs that generate machine-authored works. At worst, such a regime would enable
widespread monopolization of all future works generated by a single software program, skewing
the law disproportionately in favor of content producers to the detriment of the public.”).
Whether as traditional “professional” creators or amateurs trying to monetize, e.g., a YouTube
channel. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 225–31 (2008) (discussing the viability “hybrid economies” of online creation and
sharing).
35. See Grothaus, supra note 10. The protection by copyright would depend, in this Article’s
view, on whether humans programmed the machine. At technology stands now, that is still largely
the case.
36. In a prescient 1986 article, Pam Samuelson expressed a similar idea. See Pamela
Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1224
(1986) (“If there is no human author of such a work, how can any human be motivated to create
it? The copyright system assumes that society awards a set of exclusive rights to authors for limited
times in order to motivate them to be creative . . . .”); see also Stephen Hewitt, Protection of Works
Created by the Use of Computers, 133 NEW L.J. 235, 236–37 (1983). See generally Daniel Gervais, The
Protection Under International Copyright Law of Works Created with or by Computers, 5 INT’L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 629 (1991) (arguing that a computer was one of three things: a tool,
an assistant or an autonomous “creator,” for example when a randomizer program is used).
Interestingly, potential computer authorship (and inventorship) was discussed as far
back as 1969. See Karl F. Milde, Jr., Can a Computer Be an “Author” or an “Inventor”?, 51 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 378, 378 (1969); see also Mizuki Hashiguchi, Artificial Intelligence and the Jurisprudence of
Patent Eligibility in the United States, Europe, and Japan, 29 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., no. 12, 2017,
at 3, 4 (“With the advent of electronic computers capable of storing computer programs, the
technology of artificial intelligence started to flourish in the mid-20th century.”).
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cases and explains whether the copyright statute’s notion of “joint work”
applies.37
The Article uses both doctrinal and normative arguments. Doctrine is
essential because, in deciding whether copyright protection applies to
machine productions, a court is likely to rely first, facially at least, on doctrinal
arguments. Yet courts often clothe normativity in doctrinal garb and it is thus
equally likely, in this Article’s view, that a court decision on the protection by
copyright law of machine productions will also reflect a (normative) sense
of copyright’s raison d’être.38 This Article’s structure follows from this
understanding.39
The Article proceeds dialectically. Parts II and III of the Article discuss
two normative (Part II) and then two doctrinal (Part III) reasonings in favor
of the protection of machine productions by copyright. Those arguments are
that: (1) value is generated by AI machines and that someone should be able
to capture it; (2) orderly marketplace competition between human-created
and machine-produced content requires that machine productions be
protected by copyright on the same footing as human creations; (3) because
copyright has traditionally been refractory to judge the quality or aesthetic
merit of a work as a condition for protection, machine productions are
protected by copyright in the same way as human-created works; and (4) the
programmer (or perhaps the owner or user) of an AI machine can be
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a “joint work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
38. This is not uncommon generally, and in IP cases in particular. See e.g., Mark P. McKenna,
The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841–42 (2007)
(“Underneath the formal doctrinal means through which courts reached their results, they
argued, many legal rules were best understood as attempts to promote economic efficiency.
Courts simply lacked the necessary sophistication to articulate the true bases of their decisions.
The law and economics scholars then relied on this descriptive account to lend legitimacy to their
normative conclusions; economic analysis not only explained legal doctrines, but efficiency was
the right goal for the law to pursue.”).
39. To avoid any risk of a misunderstanding, this Article uses the term “doctrinal” to refer
to a focus on positive law, including of course common law. See Joseph William Singer, Normative
Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 905 (2009) (“Most scholarship either uses economic
analysis of law, traditional doctrinal analysis that focuses on precedent and eschews sustained
normative argument, critical analysis that reveals inconsistencies in the law or the arguments of
others but refuses to make normative claims, or social science analysis that understands law from
the outside, developing empirical information about how the world works. . . . The normative
work that one finds in the law reviews is often done at such a high level of abstraction that it is
unclear how to apply the analysis to particular legal disputes. Or it is so sophisticated, nuanced,
and complex that it cannot easily generate the few sentences one can write in a judicial opinion.
Although scholars have the luxury of equivocation, the truth is judges decide cases and they need
reasons to justify their choices.”).
The Article attempts to eschew the critique contained in the second part of Professor
Singer’s comment above. See also Terry Hutchinson, Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury, in
RESEARCH METHODS IN LAW 8, 10 (Dawn Watkins & Mandy Burton eds., 2d ed. 2018) (explaining
how doctrinal research typically forms the basis of most types of legal research).
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considered a proxy author for copyright purposes, either directly or under
the work made for hire doctrine. These four pro-protection reasonings are
not meant to be an exhaustive survey of the reasons that might be used to
justify the protection of machine productions.40 Based on a review of the
literature on the topic, the Article chose the four reasonings that seemed to
be used most often or most adroitly in the literature. The Article explains why
the four reasonings have dubious convincing power.
Then the Article provides arguments against protection by copyright, that
is, arguments for considering machine productions as part of the public
domain from the moment of their creation. Responding structurally to Parts
II and III, in Part IV the Article centers on normative and teleological
arguments extracted from the soil of copyright history, for there one can both
find the aims of copyright in action over time and identify those aims that
have remained constant. In short, the two normative arguments focus on the
role of human authors in the establishment of the copyright regime, and the
linkages between the protection of copyrighted works, on the one hand, and
the liability of those who produce such works when liability for their creation
arises (e.g., for libel), on the other hand. Part V considers doctrinal grounds
on which courts may prefer to rely to conclude that machine productions
should remain copyright-free.41 Those grounds are, first, the core doctrine of
originality, and second, the notion of derivative work, which has also been
used as an argument in favor of protection of machine productions by
copyright. As the Article explains, however, a proper analysis of the notion
leads to the conclusion that it provides an argument against protection. In
Part VI, the Article offers a path forward and specifically a test based on some
of the latest technological developments to separate the human creative
wheat from the machine proto-creative chaff.42 It then applies the proposed
test to three fact patterns to illustrate its application.
II. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION
There are four reasonings identified by this Article that have emerged to
justify copyright protection for machine productions. The Article begins by
considering two normative positions taken by pro-protection advocates.
A. PROTECTING VALUE
The first reasoning says that, because some machine productions are
worth something to someone, then they should be protected by law. This
40. Indeed, how could someone make a claim of exhaustivity in this context?
41. Discussing doctrinal arguments after normative ones also allows the Article to illuminate
the normativity (or absence thereof) of doctrine.
42. This Article uses the term “proto-creative” to refer to productions (as the term is
defined, supra note 15) that “look like” creative works and, therefore, prima facie copyrightable
subject matter, but do not result from human creative choices. As the Article explains (see infra
notes 173–74), creative choices are the sine qua non of copyright protection.
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reasoning can be dealt with quickly. This “intuition” that value must be
protected occasionally underpins court decisions sotto voce, and sometimes
explicitly so, as in a British case in which the court noted “if it is worth copying
it is worth protecting.”43 This is a normative error based on a
vague restitutionary (or “reap/sow”) impulse that some value was
misappropriated.44 It is plainly bad law, both doctrinally and normatively,
because free riding is not illegal.45 The law protects things that have value,
and things that do not, but there is no rule that the law must protect
everything that has, or may have, value.46
There are, moreover, strong examples that illustrate the value of allowing
some free-riding in the sphere of copyright, including parody, satire, the
creation of transformative works and the enrichment of the public domain.47

43. Univ. of London Press v. Univ. of London Tutorial Press [1916] 2 Ch. 601 at 610 (Eng.).
The intuition was at play in the well-known 1918 case of International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918), in which the Supreme Court created a “hot news” tort to protect
short news releases, noting that the defendant should not “reap where it has not sown.” In a more
recent case, the Second Circuit limited (albeit in dicta) the tort to cases where the free-riding
would pose a “threat to the very existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.”
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 1997).
44. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166–67 (1992) (“[A]t the center of the pro-property wave of cases
lies the conviction that it is unjust ‘to appropriate the fruits of another’s labor’ and its corollary,
that one should not reap where another has sown. One might call this either a ‘restitutionary’ or
an ‘appropriative’ notion. ‘Restitutionary’ is the more general term: it reflects a belief that some
unspecified rewards are due to those whose labor produces benefits and that when third parties
intercept these rewards, the law should intervene to effect their restoration. To conceptualize the
underlying impulse as ‘appropriative’ is to reflect a belief that the reward due should take the
specific form of a grant of property rights.”).
45. See Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 622 (2003)
(“When misappropriation is thought of in the large, as it were, the tendency is to analogize it to
theft. . . . But the analogy to theft is imperfect. The car thief deprives me of my property; the
copier does not—I retain it and remain free to license or sell it. And while the copying may reduce
my income from the work because I have lost the exclusive use of my property, though not the
use, the reduction may not be great. It may even be zero. . . .”).
46. See id. Then the question is value to whom? Landes & Posner have argued that
overexposure (“overgrazing” the commons) may reduce the societal value of works as they enter
the public domain. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 484–88 (2003). Their claim is debatable. For a refutation, see Dennis S.
Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1073 (2006)
(“[C]opyright-protected works can be reproduced without in any way inhibiting their further
reproduction in the future, so this potential conflict between present and future values does not
arise. Nor is there any conflict between current high- and low-valuing users, because both can use
the work freely (absent property rights). Neither in the case of grazing fields nor in the case
of copyright-protected works do property rights insure ‘value’ against a change in consumer
preferences.”).
47. As Professor Lessig has noted, some free-riding is not the issue. That copyright law does
not allow enough free-riding may be more of a problem. See Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress
in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2005). For an example, see the application of fair
use to appropriation art discussed in Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law
Protects Foxes Better Than Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 848–52 (2013).
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A variation of the theme of this reasoning is that copyright must create
incentives not for the creation of new material (because AI machines need no
such incentives to run their code) but to disseminate it.48 First of all, whether
this incentive is in fact required and would be efficient would need to be
demonstrated. Second of all, even if the need for some sort of incentive were
demonstrated, whether copyright is the proper legal vector to provide the
incentive isn’t clear at all.49
B. MARKETPLACE COMPETITION
The second reasoning advanced to justify the grant of copyright
protection to machine productions strikes this Article as potentially more
convincing. It is based on a consequentialist analysis and argues that machine
productions should be protected because, if machine-productions are
copyright-free, then machines produce free goods (e.g., music) that compete
with paid works (that is, those created by humans expecting a financial
return) and thus distort the market.50 Is this “dystopian vision of a literary
market saturated by machine-authored drivel” merely “a moment of historical
anxiety within the creative class,” as Professor Bridy suggested?51 Even now,
thousands of articles written by machines compete with human staff in the
media.52
48. See Denicola, supra note 5, at 283 (arguing that AI machine productions should be
protected by copyright to maintain “incentives for humans to disseminate works [which] is also
critical in insuring the ultimate public benefits sought by copyright”).
49. Copyright might just do the opposite, as it has demonstrably done in other cases because
the incentive only works if licensing structures and other elements of commercial exploitation
are in place. See Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of Copyrighted Works: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1053
(2008) (“The data presented herein clearly suggest that the public domain status of popular
books does not result in underexploitation.”).
50. For an exemplar of a similar train of thought, see Vasconcellos Grubow, supra note 27,
at 419–22. On the largest music platform, YouTube (by an order of magnitude), most music is
free, however, users often “pay” by watching ads. See Rebecca Pollack, Innovation or Exploitation: Is
It Time to Update the DMCA Safe Harbors?, 34 ENT. & SPORTS L., no. 3, Spring 2018, at 37, 38
(“YouTube alone represent[s] 46% of this listening time. 85% of YouTube users, approximately
1.3 billion people, use the platform primarily to listen to music.”). Those ads tend to be appended
to professionally created content. See T. Randolph Beard et al., Safe Harbors and the Evolution of
Online Platform Markets: An Economic Analysis, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 309, 328 (2018)
(“Content identification systems have arisen, in part, from the desire of UUC platforms to
monetize the viewing of material they host as viewership (and thus advertising potential) is higher
for professionally-generated and protected content.”); Todd Spangler, YouTube Standardizes
Ad-Revenue Split for All Partners, But Offers Upside Potential, VARIETY (Nov. 1, 2013, 4:39 PM),
http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/youtube-standardizes-ad-revenue-split-for-all-partnersbut-offers-upside-potential-1200786223 [https://perma.cc/MF8T-N496] (“[T]he majority of
YouTube’s user-generated content does not have advertising, so YouTube must recoup its costs
from content that it can monetize.”).
51. Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing Roald Dahl’s 1954 short story The Great
Automatic Grammatizor).
52. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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This reasoning suggests that protecting machine productions by
copyright and making their use (potentially) subject to authorization and
payment would level the commercial playing field because incentives would
be the same to disseminate both human and AI created content.53 Given the
societal impact of machines competing with humans in this space—and even
more so as machines climb the creativity ladder—the doctrinal question that
emerges, namely who (which natural or legal person) should be the legal or
proxy “author” (and thus the one to authorize the use of, and get paid for,
the machine’s work), takes on a deep normative hue: Can machines truly
create works of authorship?54 This boils down to the inquiry that lies at the
core of this Article’s analysis: Is authorship a human prerogative?55 As a matter of
copyright law, this Article answers the question in the affirmative.
The Introduction explained the Article’s underlying belief and
mobilizing assumption that human progress will best be achieved by humans,
not machines.56 This means that incentives designed to promote authorship
of literary and artistic works, including the very ability to produce them in
fields from journalism to art and in their diversity of expression—which
requires not just talent (however defined) but the investment of time to hone
one’s creative skills—must be available only to humans.57
Part IV continues the discussion by focusing on the role of authors in the
evolution of copyright law. For now, we turn to pro-protection doctrinal
arguments.

53. As Denicola explains, copyright incentives have traditionally targeted dissemination at
least as much as creation. See supra note 48.
54. A detailed doctrinal analysis shows that using existing concepts to attribute ownership
do not lead to consistent results. See Andrew J. Wu, From Video Games to Artificial Intelligence:
Assigning Copyright Ownership to Works Generated by Increasingly Sophisticated Computer Programs, 25
AIPLA Q.J. 131, 178 (1997) (“[A] handful of principles can lead to at least five different
results. . . .”).
55. There is also an empirical response to the suggestion that free machine productions
distort the market with free works competing with paid ones now, including on the largest music
platform in the world. YouTube is generally free and Spotify offers free (with advertisement) or
paid subscriptions. See Daniel Sanchez, What Streaming Music Services Pay (Updated for 2018),
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/01/16/
streaming-music-services-pay-2018 [https://perma.cc/76H2-XRFZ]. The dilemma about
whether to grant exclusive rights in machine productions applies not just to writing but to reading
as well, as machines are increasingly trusted to identify what we should read. Machine reading in
the form of “text and data mining” (which overlaps with deep learning) is typically allowed as fair
use under copyright law, and this process is thus much less subject to copyright restrictions than
human reading. See supra note 26.
Professor Grimmelmann has suggested that the freer hand of machines valorizes
“robotic reading” and “denigrates human reading.” James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate
Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 675 (2016).
56. This is explicated in greater detail in GERVAIS, supra note 28, at 23.
57. The pro-protection argument that copyright should provide an incentive to generate
more AI machine productions to regulate marketplace competition was rejected. See supra note
35 and accompanying text.
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III. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTION
A. ROLE OF AESTHETIC MERIT
This first pro-protection doctrinal reasoning claims that because
copyright doctrine does not care about the quality or merit of a copyrighted
work—indeed, this has been a tenet of copyright law for well over a century
—machine productions should be protected.58 This reasoning can also be
discarded in short order, for it is simply an inaccurate application of this
venerable principle: Stating that machine productions need not have artistic
merit is different from the actual question that must be asked and answered,
namely whether such productions are original works of authorship—for that is
the only thing that copyright protects.59 The issue is not aesthetic merit,
therefore, but whether authorship (and the originality through which it is
manifested) exists.60
As applied by courts, originality requires human authorship.61 Human
“creative choices” generate the originality required to benefit from copyright
protection.62 As examined in the next Section, this principle is reflected in
copyright theories that conclude that there are good reasons to limit
copyright protection to human-authored works.63
B. HUMANS AS PROXY AUTHORS
In its simplest version, the last pro-protection reasoning goes like this: If
A owns the AI code, A also owns what the AI code produces. The same
reasoning could be applied to a machine’s user or owner.
This is not an entirely new debate, as courts have grappled in the past
with the protection by copyright of works “generated by” machines—though

58. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, writing for the majority, rejected artistic merit as a factor to determine
copyright protection. Id.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title,
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . .”).
60. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez, Copyrightability of Artworks
Produced by Creative Robots and Originality: The Formality-Objective Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
1, 7–9 (2018).
61. See Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[S]ome element
of human creativity must have occurred in order for the Book to be copyrightable.”(emphasis
added)); Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324, 2016 WL 362231, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016),
aff’d, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have repeatedly
referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when analyzing authorship under the Act.”).
62. See supra note 61; see also infra Section IV.A.
63. This is also the view of the U.S. Copyright Office. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 608 (3d ed. 2017) (“Examples of situations
where the Office will refuse to register a claim include: . . . The work lacks human authorship.”).
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not AI machines as they are defined in this Article.64 Although the paradigm
on which the protection by copyright law of such computer-generated works
is based dates back to the late 1980s, it was still alive and well until at least
2004–2005.65 This paradigm is binary: Either the machine is seen as a mere
tool for a human user, in which case the user is the author of any
copyrightable subject matter produced; or the machine only generates
content as it had been programmed to do, so that the programmer is
considered the author of this (predictable) output.66 A classic example of the
former is the use of word-processing software, which, despite its helpfulness
in correcting typos, formatting text, identifying clunky sentences or providing
synonyms, does not cross the “mere tool” threshold, in which case the human
user of the software is the author of the text.67 An example of the latter is a
videogame in which the user chooses among predetermined options decided
by the programmer.68 The programmer of a videogame can be said to have

64. So-called “generators” have been in use for a while, though admittedly AI machines add
a significant dimension to the discussion because they can make decisions. See supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
65. For 2004, see Charles Cronin, Virtual Music Scores, Copyright and the Promotion of a
Marginalized Technology, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 18–19 (2004) (“Recent advances in artificial
intelligence notwithstanding, . . . the relevant question is not whether a computer can be
considered an author, but rather what is the appropriate assignment or apportionment of
copyright in computer-generated works between human programmers and human users of their
software programs.”). For 2005, see Ralston, supra note 4, at 281.
Professor Grimmelmann argued in a 2016 article, however, that “there is nothing new
under the sun” here, and that it is, at bottom, essentially a question of allocating rights between
the programmer and the user. See James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a ComputerAuthored Work—And It’s a Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 404 (2016).
66. This was apparently true of computer music composition, at least up to 2005. See
Ralston, supra note 4, at 291 (“At various points in between these two extremes, contributions to
the character of the musical composition may be dominated by either the programmer (in setting
the rules and parameters), the user (in setting parameters or feeding in source material), or HAL
(in generating random numbers).”); see also Evan H. Farr, Copyrightability of Computer-Created Works,
15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 63, 80 (1989) (“[T]he author of the underlying computer
program is the only individual who contributes enough creative intellectual effort to satisfy the
copyright requirement of authorship.”); Jane C. Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Authors and
Machines, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 343, 365 (2019). The machine’s output can also be “random.”
See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 8, at 675.
67. The debate about the scope and nature of the computer’s role is alive and well in the
U.K. and Ireland, as laws in both jurisdictions define “computer-generated works.” See RICHARD
KEMP, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (V2.0) 2 (2018) (discussing whether the U.K.
Copyright Act’s reference to “computer-generated works” applies to AI).
As a well-known Irish textbook explains, “[a] work that is produced by a human being
who produces that work by using a typewriter or work processor is clearly not deprived of
protection because of the mechanical means used.” ROBERT CLARK & SHANE SMYTH,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN IRELAND 252 (1997).
68. See, e.g., Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855–56 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams
Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1982). Both cases held that the
programmer of a videogame had copyright in the audiovisual output. In Stern Electronics, the
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authored the audiovisual output because, in fact, she did: She created the
code and files generating the images and sounds.69
Both sides of this paradigmatic coin are predicated on a simple analytical
device: effacing the creative role, if any, of the machine. There is very little,
if any, unpredictability created by the machine in the output. In the word
processing example, a human decides virtually everything. In the case of a
videogame, the user/player only chooses among a set of predetermined
options.70 In the case of so-called random generators, no choice is made by
either machine or human.71 The paradigm is a poor reflection of the
technological picture painted by AI because AI machines have a degree of
autonomy and make decisions.72 “AI can function not just by virtue of what it
has been programmed to do but learns and changes of its own accord.”73 The
automated decision-making feature of deep learning machines, in contrast
to the two sides of the old paradigm, adds unpredictability—but not
randomness—and in doing so it breaks the causal link between humans (the
author of the code or the user of the machine) and the output.74 Granting
copyright protection to the (unpredictable) output of the AI machine would,
as Pam Samuelson rightly noted, “over-reward[] the programmer, particularly
in light of the fact that the programmer is no more able to anticipate the
output than anyone else.”75
The binary paradigm is outdated and cannot be applied tel quel to AI for
at least two reasons. First, a deep learning AI machine—even more so one
capable of writing or modifying its own code—will produce outcomes not

Second Circuit noted “[s]omeone first conceived what the audiovisual display would look like
and sound like. Originality occurred at that point.” Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 856.
69. See supra note 68.
70. See Stern Elecs., 669 F.2d at 856.
71. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (“‘[I]t was
undisputed at trial that Toro’s parts numbering system was arbitrary and random.’ There was no
evidence that a particular series or configuration of numbers denoted a certain type or category
of parts or that the numbers used encoded any kind of information at all. In short, numbers were
assigned to a part without rhyme or reason. This record establishes that appellant’s parts
numbering ‘system’ falls short of even the low threshold of originality. The random and arbitrary
use of numbers in the public domain does not evince enough originality to distinguish
authorship.”).
72. For example, machines can make decisions on whether to accept claims for
governmental benefits. The European Commission recently published an assessment of
automated decision-making based on European personal data transferred to the United States.
See GABRIELA BODEA ET AL., AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL DATA
THAT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM THE EU TO COMPANIES CERTIFIED UNDER THE EU-U.S.
PRIVACY SHIELD 11, 14–15 (2018) (referring to “automated processing of personal data to take
decisions affecting the individual (e.g. credit lending, mortgage offers, employment)”).
73. TURNER, supra note 18, at 56.
74. See Samuelson, supra note 36, at 1207–09.
75. See id. at 1208.
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foreseeable by the human programmer(s), with little if any human input.76
Second, a key feature of machine-learning processes is their ability to detect
correlations and patterns.77 This is crucial because research on the human
creative process suggests that creativity comes from the ability to associate
ideas not previously associated.78 Machines can find such associations and
correlations faster and in much larger pools of data than any human and
transform them into new literary and artistic productions.79 For example, a
semantic Google toolkit known as word2vec is already in broad use to
understand “how words are used in relation to one another”—a process
known as “word embedding”—which is a key step in literary creation.80 Using
neural network technology, such systems are mimicking human information
processing activity in several fields, and they are getting ever closer to being
truly “creative.”81
The fourth reasoning is thus flawed as the technology stands now, and it
will be increasingly unconvincing as technology progresses. Stating that the
extant paradigm is obsolete suggests that it should be replaced with a new
analytical prism based on a more nuanced view of the technological present
and (near) future that reflects the autonomy of AI machines and the fact

76. A human user or programmer can provide feedback on outputs as the machine learns.
See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Simpler World? On Pruning Risks and Harvesting Fruits in an
Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 33 n.16 (2017) (describing issues with
feedback in pattern recognition and how algorithms are allowed “to mutate slightly over time”).
77. Creativity can be defined as “the ability to make or otherwise bring into existence
something new, whether a new solution to a problem, a new method or device, or a new
artistic object or form.” Barbara Kerr, Creativity, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/creativity/Research-on-the-creative-process [https://perma.cc/NYG2-M5
4U]; see also GEORGE F. KNELLER, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CREATIVITY 59 (Toronto: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1965) (“Creativity, as has been said, consists largely of rearranging what we
know in order to find out what we do not know.”); Dana Beldiman, Utilitarian Information Works
—Is Originality the Proper Lens?, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 42–44 (2010).
78. See Beldiman, supra note 77, at 42 (“Creativity is defined as a mental process in the
course of which new associations between existing ideas or concepts are made and new ideas
or concepts are generated.”); see also ROBERT W. WEISBERG, CREATIVITY: BEYOND THE MYTH
OF GENIUS 4–5, 247–48 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds., 1993) (explaining what creativity
encompasses and discussing to what extent it includes new ideas).
79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing an AI system that composed a
musical piece resembling a famous composer’s work). On the ability of AI machines using “big
data” corpora (e.g., a database of thousands of existing musical recordings or novels), see
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Hearing on Big Data: Note by
BIAC, at ¶ 7, DAF/COMP/WD(2016)77 (Nov. 17, 2016), available at https://one.oecd.org/
document/DAF/COMP/WD(2016)77/en/pdf [https://perma.cc/WUV6-HJ84] (noting the
ability of AI machines to “identify[] ‘hidden relations (patterns), e.g., correlations among facts,
interactions among entities, [and] relations among concepts’”).
80. See Levendowski, supra note 18, at 580–81.
81. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 8, at 675 (“[Current AI systems] are called ‘neural
networks’ because they mimic the function of human brains by absorbing and distributing their
information processing capacity to groups of receptors that function like neurons; they find and
create connections and similarities within the data they process.”).

A3_GERVAIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2072

7/19/2020 8:40 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:2053

pattern now at hand.82 AI machines can make autonomous choices too far
removed from the machine’s human-programmed code to validly consider
the programmer(s) as proxy author(s), and yet not random or entirely
functional.83
A final note on this last pro-protection reasoning before moving on: The
reasoning echoes the first (normative) reasoning in that it assumes that
someone must own rights in the machine production if that production has
(commercial) value. The default normative stance could easily be, and this
Article believes that it should be, the exact opposite, namely that “we should
take this uncertainty as an opportunity to rethink rationales for privatization
. . . [and] consider a public domain model for AIs creations.”84
Let us now turn to arguments against protection.
IV. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROTECTION
Is human authorship dyed in the wool of copyright?
Many a historiography of copyright places the emergence of the
(human) author as its central theme. In other words, authors are often
depicted as the pivot around which copyright rights have evolved since their
emergence.85 This holds true whether copyright is seen in a natural rights
perspective (where rights stem from an author’s labor), or in an
instrumentalist/utilitarian perspective (as an incentive for authors).86 The
question to answer is, as noted above, must authors be human for purposes of
obtaining copyright protection? To answer this question in the affirmative,
this Article begins with a look back with the purpose of unearthing the role of
humanness in authorship.
Section IV.A demonstrates that the roots of copyright law were planted
in a soil which requires humanness of authorship for a work to be protected.
82. See infra Part V.
83. Arguably, as seen in the music and newspaper articles mentioned in the Article’s
opening paragraph. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI (returning
to the issue of whether AI machines can get too far removed from the human code).
84. Ana Ramalho, Will Robots Rule the (Artistic) World?: A Proposed Model for the Legal Status of
Creations by Artificial Intelligence Systems, 21 J. INTERNET L. 11, 22 (2017).
85. See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 49 (1993)
(“What was novel about the [S]tatute [of Anne, the first “copyright” statute adopted in a common
law jurisdiction] was that it constituted the author . . . as a person with legal standing.”); see also
infra Section IV.A.2 (describing the Statute of Anne).
86. See John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics)
of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2011) (“The historical battle over copyright
protection pitted adherents of two different theoretical frameworks against one another:
utilitarianism and natural law. The utilitarians emphasized copyright’s role in providing
individuals with the necessary economic incentives to encourage the production and
dissemination of creative works. . . . [O]ver the past century and a half, utilitarianism has
gradually given way to a natural law vision of copyright, heavily influenced by the theories of John
Locke and William Blackstone. Born less of welfare-maximization than labor-desert factors, this
vision is grounded in the inherent rights of authors to the fruits of their labor . . . .”).
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Section IV.B argues that machine productions should not be protected by
copyright because machines cannot be held responsible and, historically,
protection and responsibility have been two sides of the same normative coin.
A. THE HUMANNESS OF AUTHORSHIP
This Section of the Article uses a historicist lens to untangle the mesh
that binds copyright and authors.
Professor Sam Ricketson—a co-author of the leading treatise on the most
important international copyright treaty (the Berne Convention)87—opined
that “the need for the author[s] to be a human being and for there to be some
intellectual contribution” is a longstanding assumption in national copyright
laws.88 He is correct.89 Indeed, this assumption dates back to well before the
original (1886) text of the Berne Convention; it harkens back to the very roots
of copyright, and, as we shall now see, even earlier.
1. The Early Figure of the Author
The figure of the “author” (from the Latin auctor, or originator) of an
intellectual work as the “natural” holder of rights in that work began to appear
in the West as early as the thirteenth century.90 That is approximately when
the first books were published in the first person: Books in which the author
claimed that her art and knowledge, and the subjectivity of her work, created
value in the work.91 Divine inspiration gave way to the lyrical “I” as the source

87. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, revised July 24,
1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
88. The treatise referred to is 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006). See
Sam Ricketson, The 1992 Horace S. Manges Lecture—People or Machines: The Berne Convention and the
Changing Concept of Authorship, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 2, 10 (1991) (describing “the
premier copyright convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works”). The Berne Convention had 178 member states as of December 2018. WIPO-Administered
Treaties: Contracting Parties > Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15 [https://perma.cc/QD8F-BM8G]. The
United States became a party to the Convention on March 1, 1989. Id.
89. An analysis of multiple national laws led another scholar to a similar conclusion. See
Andres Guadamuz, Artificial Intelligence and Copyright, WIPO MAG. (Oct. 2017), https://
www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/05/article_0003.html [https://perma.cc/7HJ7-L5NR]
(“Most jurisdictions, including Spain and Germany, state that only works created by a human can
be protected by copyright.”).
90. See John Tehranian, Copyright’s Male Gaze: Authorship and Inequality in a Panoptic World,
41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 343, 385 (2018) (“Given the etymological roots of the word ‘authorship,’
its link to the concept of authority should not be surprising. Sharing the same etymological root,
the terms ‘authority’ and ‘author’ derive from the Latin word ‘auctor,’ which refers to an
originator or promoter. As such, the search for authorship is a quest to determine the originator
of a work or, quite literally, the person who possesses authority over it. In one sense, therefore,
the idea of authorship speaks to the traditional search for a mastermind at the time of creation.”).
91. See generally MICHEL ZINK, LA SUBJECTIVITÉ LITTÉRAIRE: AUTOUR DU SIÈCLE DE SAINT
LOUIS (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985) (identifying the thirteenth century as an
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of truth and, in doing so, allowed a new aesthetic to emerge.92 That
distinction, in turn, led to a separation between objective and subjective truth,
between history and story. This evolution would be felt not just in literature but
also in philosophical texts soon after the fall of Constantinople in 1453—the
date used as the milestone for the end of the Middle Ages. It is then that
humanist philosophy emerged and focused on human creativity, wisdom and
individual erudition.93
The introduction of the printing press across Europe in the middle of
the fifteenth century was a powerful catalyst that accelerated the shift toward
individualistic (human) authorship, both qualitatively and quantitatively, as
texts could be distributed and read much more widely and more new texts
published.94 This reinforced the emphasis on the role, and increased the
social status of authors who, freed from the need to rely on patrons, could
publish in their own name and hope to make a living from their craft.95 The
narrative of the individual author and his “genius” thus found fertile soil in
the Renaissance.
A crucial first step to be able to acknowledge the author at the time was
self-evidently the ability to name the author. In medieval Europe, this was far
from obvious. Until the sixteenth century, in many European countries there
was no fully developed onomastic system, an absence which limited the ability
to name the author—which seems a prerequisite to the attribution of the
work.96 Shakespeare (1564–1616), for example, “never bothered to
regularize the spelling of his name, either in his personal practice or in the

inflection point in (French) literature—from merely working with revealed and arguably
objective truths, authors could build “new truths” using their subjective creativity).
92. ISABELLE DIU & ELISABETH PARINET, HISTOIRE DES AUTEURS 44 (Place des éditeurs eds.,
2013).
93. See id.
94. William Caxton is believed to have introduced the printing press in England in 1476,
26 years after its purported invention by Gutenberg. See D. Victoria Baranetsky, Encryption and the
Press Clause, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 179, 188–92 (2017) (explaining how John Milton
and many of his contemporaries, including Henry Robinson, William Walwyn, Roger Williams,
John Lilburne, John Saltmarsh, and John Goodwin, expounded on the importance of freedom
following from introduction of the printing press and quoting Robinson as “[writing], referring
to the printing press, that ‘no man can have a natural monopoly of [it]’” (quoting NANCY C.
CORNWELL, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 24 (2004) (second
alteration in original))).
95. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 66–69 (2007).
96. See DIU & PARINET, supra note 92, at 44–45. The adoption of “two-element naming” in
various European countries (that is, forename and surname) helped to solve this. See George T.
Beech, Preface to PERSONAL NAMES STUDIES OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE: SOCIAL IDENTITY AND FAMILIAL
STRUCTURES xii–xiii, ix (George T. Beech et al. eds., 2002); Pascal Chareille, Methodological
Problems in a Quantitative Approach to Changes in Naming, in PERSONAL NAMES STUDIES OF MEDIEVAL
EUROPE: SOCIAL IDENTITY AND FAMILIAL STRUCTURES, supra, at 15, 16; Lluís To Figueras, Personal
Naming and Structures of Kinship in the Medieval Spanish Peasantry, in PERSONAL NAMES STUDIES OF
MEDIEVAL EUROPE, supra, at 53, 59; François Menant, What Were People Called in Communal Italy?,
in PERSONAL NAMES STUDIES OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE, supra, at 97, 100.
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practice of others.”97 Once the model of a first name and family name
(surname) had been more firmly established, however, the author’s name
began appearing on the title page of books.98 The idea of authorship (as a
matter that one could claim) emerged.99 It established deep linkages between
author and work. This is directly relevant in this discussion because
attribution of a work to a machine seems to raise similar naming issues.100
The seventeenth century would take for granted that identified
individuals could and should publish books under their own name and be
recognized as authors.101 Descartes’ Discourse on the Method is a prime
example.102 Descartes added not just his name but a central philosophical
stone to the edifice of individualism. Cogito ergo sum: The individual’s ability
to think not just as a prerequisite to writing but as the very proof of her
existence.103
2. The Statute of Anne and Early American Law
British copyright history also put the human author at the center of the
normative stage. The usefulness of this narrative crossing of the Atlantic in
the Article follows from the fact that the first state copyright statutes and the
first federal (U.S.) copyright statute of 1790 were near identical copies of the
(British) Statute of Anne of 1710.104

97. Bruce Thomas Boehrer, The Poet of Labor: Authorship and Property in the Work of Ben Jonson,
72 PHILOLOGICAL Q. 289, 289 (1993).
98. DIU & PARINET, supra note 92, at 48.
99. Erasmus, the famous Dutch scholar, wanted his name on his translation of the New
Testament. Id. at 49. A book published in Florence in the second half of the sixteenth century,
entitled Lives of the Most Excellent Painters, Sculptors and Architects, which focused on Michelangelo
and other Renaissance artists, is considered “a charter text of Renaissance individualism.” MARCO
RUFFINI, ART WITHOUT AN AUTHOR: VASARI’S LIVES AND MICHELANGELO’S DEATH 1 (2011).
100. See generally Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 8, at 718–20 (discussing the difficulty of attributing
authorship to a machine for copyright purposes).
101. See Simon Stern, What Authors Do, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 461, 469 (2003) (explaining
the emergence of attribution to authors in seventeenth century England).
102. The Discourse was published in 1637. René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly
Conducting the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF
DESCARTES 79–130 (Elizabeth S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross trans., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed.
1931).
103. See id.
104. See Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The Copyright
Clause and Congress’s Power to Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (2002) (“American
copyright law was patterned after its British counterpart, which was first codified in the Statute of
Anne.”); see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96
VA. L. REV. 549, 559 (2010) (“[B]oth the first U.S. Copyright Act of 1790 and its predecessor,
the British Statute of Anne, distributed initial ownership of copyrights to individual authors,
abandoning the previous English practice of consolidating ownership in the members of the
exclusive Stationers’ Company of publishers and booksellers. Subsequent amendments to the
U.S. Copyright Act have retained the initial allocation of ownership to authors.”).
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The Statute of Anne granted authors and their assigns the sole right and
liberty of printing books for a period of 14 years from first publication.105 The
question for our purposes is, why authors. Starting early in the sixteenth
century and until the Statute of Anne, English law protected publishers, not
authors.106 The stationers (the forefathers of modern publishers) had
organized themselves in a guild known as the Stationers Company, and guild
membership implied exclusivity of publication.107 Questions emerged rather
quickly concerning the enforcement of the exclusivity stemming from guild
membership against non-members.108 Publishers achieved erga omnes
protection by combining a ban on the importation of foreign books (in
1534)109 and the grant by Queen Mary of a Charter to the Company (in 1556)
that allowed the Stationers to search out and destroy any book printed in
contravention of the Statute of proclamation.110 As a result, only books
licensed by the Stationers could be registered and legally printed in the U.K.,
as entries in the register were restricted to Company members.111 This served
both the interests of publishers and of the Crown, which could maintain
a degree of control over new publications.112 If copyright had continued as a
right granted only to economic entities such as publishers, without any
emphasis on human creativity, an argument that machine productions

105. A second term of 14 years was possible, provided the author was still alive. See An Act for
the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or
Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times therein Mentioned 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, §§ 1, 11
(Eng.).
106. See infra note 117. Authors had a right at common law to prevent first publication.
107. In other words, no guild member could publish, without authorization, a book already
published by another member.
108. See WILLIAM R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 345–46 (5th ed. 2003).
109. As a point of reference, Caxton introduced the printing press into England in 1476, 26
years after its invention by Gutenberg.
110. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 108, at 345–46.
111. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2–3 (1967) (“Caxton
founded his press in Westminster in 1476 . . . .”); see also Howard Jay Graham, “Our Tong Maternall
Maruellously Amendyd and Augmentyd”: The First Englishing and Printing of the Medieval Statutes at
Large, 1530–1533, 13 UCLA L. REV. 58, 58 (1965) (“William Caxton printed the first book in
English in 1475, the first book in England in 1476.”).
112. Interestingly, the system was enforced both through the Star Chamber and, for
Elizabeth and her Stuart successors, through the Church, no doubt a reflection of the deep
religious struggles of that period.
James I also issued “printing patents,” in the same form as letters patent concerning
“inventions” to certain publishers, but most were issued to Company members. But those patents
were limited in time and thus much less important than the unlimited stationers “copyright.” The
censorship element was reinforced by various decrees of the Star Chamber issued in 1566, 1586
and 1637. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5–6 (1968).
Charles II allowed the privilege to lapse in 1679 but he reinstated it in 1662 after his
restoration. While James II revived it for seven more years in 1685, it could not last long in the
political climate of his dethronement and Parliament refused to renew it in 1694. See id.
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deserve the same fate might be easier to make today. History, would, however,
take a different path.
John Milton113 and John Locke were instrumental in the fight to put an
end to the Stationers’ “licensing” regime, which they (rightly) considered as
a form of prepublication censorship.114 This fight, which would sow the seeds
of human authorship in copyright law for centuries to come, began as a
movement for a protection of authors anchored in natural rights stemming
from the protection of the author’s labor.115
This Article does not need fully to re-litigate the scope and validity of
Lockean justification(s) for copyright.116 What matters for our purposes is

113. See generally JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICEN[SE]D PRINTING
(1644) (speaking against government regulation of printed materials).
114. ROSE, supra note 85, at 28–32. Milton became famous in copyright history for another
reason: his contract with printer Samuel Simmons, by which Milton gave over to Simmons “[a]ll
that [b]ooke [sic] [c]opy or [m]anuscript . . . with the full benefitt [sic] profitt [sic] & advantage
thereof or which shall or may arise thereby.” Peter Lindenbaum, Milton’s Contract, 10 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439, 441 (1992) (quoting 4 THE LIFE RECORDS OF JOHN MILTON, 429–31 (J.
Milton French ed., 1966)).
The sale of all his rights in Paradise Lost for the sum of £20 was used as evidence both
that authors were entitled to proprietorship in their work (as far back as the 1660s), and that
publishers were (and are) treating authors unfairly. See Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Milton’s
Contract 1667, PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450–1900) (2008), available at http://
www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1667 [https://
perma.cc/WQ2L-FP4K]; see also Lindenbaum, supra, at 452–54.
115. Locke’s views justify first and foremost a property right derived from manual labor. JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 209 (1821) (“[E]very man has a property in his own
person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands,
we may say, are properly his.”).
Locke also favored a temporary exclusive right for authors in copyrighted works and
that he was also aware of the need for the material to enrich the public domain using the work
of past authors. See 1 PETER KING, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE, WITH EXTRACTS FROM HIS
CORRESPONDENCE, JOURNALS, AND COMMON-PLACE BOOKS 203, 208–09 (1830); see also Wendy J.
Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1539 (1993) (“[A]lthough natural rights give some support to what
proponents of expansive intellectual property call ‘authors’ rights,’ they also give support to the
general population and to the population of creative users who need to employ others’ work.”).
If intellectual property, of which copyright forms part, may have emerged from the
Lockean font, it started its separation from manual labor early on, both in England and the
United States. See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Framework for Copyright Philosophy
and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1315 (2003) (“Beginning in 1709, England singled out
intellectual property from other areas of law, distinctly from other forms of labor. The United
States and even France took similar approaches. The underlying basis was a recognition that
intellectual enterprise serves the public in a manner fundamentally different from other forms
of labor, and thus needs to be clothed with sufficient reward for the most capable to serve society
in this capacity.”).
116. It is admittedly the source of fascinating academic debates. See also Tom W. Bell, Escape
from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 763 (2001) (“Locke’s . . . labor-desert justification of property gives an author clear
title only to the particular tangible copy in which she fixes her expression—not to some intangible
plat in the noumenal realm of ideas. Locke himself did not try to justify intangible property.”).
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that, after approximately a century and a half of exclusive publisher privileges
amounting to indirect censorship granted to publishers and in a political
climate where those privileges could not be renewed (thus leaving the
Stationers with no protection erga omnes), the Statute of Anne granted a right
to authors.117 The shift was in part the result of the Stationers’ instrumental
reliance in their petition to Parliament for some kind of legal protection for
books on the Lockean/natural right of the authors in their works—indeed
this was a pan-European strategy of publishers at the time.118 This strategy paid
off because focusing the attention on authors allowed booksellers to achieve
their aims, while avoiding the problem of defending an unpopular trade
monopoly seen as censorship.119
The embedded question that matters directly here is, why did the
publishers’ reliance on authors work so well? Why, in other words, was
it preferable that the public see that beneficiaries were said to be
“individuals”?120 There was a timely convergence of interests: On the one
hand, authors were basking in the sun of the Enlightenment, stroked by the
rays of individualism.121 On the other hand, the Stationers understood that
they needed a justificatory theory other than greed, the needs of “industry” or
indeed their mere desire to survive to convince both Parliament and the
public. That theory was (human) authorship.122
See generally Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing Lockean theories of intellectual property).
117. See Catherine Seville, The Emergence and Development of Intellectual Property Law in Western
Europe, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 171, 180 (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 2018) (“[T]he novel reference to authors [in the Statute of Anne]
was hailed as significant in subsequent debates regarding the nature of literary property.”).
118. See Roger Chartier, Figures of the Author, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON
COPYRIGHT LAW 7, 12 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (“In England and in France, it
was actually the monarchy’s attempts to abolish the privilège . . . that led the bookseller-publishers
to link the irrevocability of their rights to the recognition of the author’s ownership of their
work.”).
119. See PATTERSON, supra note 112, at 169. To see the author merely as an excuse to grant
an exclusive right would be an oversimplification, however. Rochelle Dreyfuss rightly noted that
“publishers created the authorship category not because they recognized the central importance
of authors, but rather to achieve pecuniary objectives—because they thought it would be
politically easier to convince Parliament to enact copyright legislation if the intended
beneficiaries were said to be individuals.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research:
Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1214 (2000); see also
Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship, 23
REPRESENTATIONS 51, 54–55 (1988) (discussing the definition of an “author” and how copyright
rights developed for authors versus publishers).
120. See LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 32–34 (2001).
121. Michel Foucault commented that the modern concept “of ‘author’ constitutes the
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas.” Michel Foucault, What is an
Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141, 141
(Josué V. Harari ed., 1979).
122. The theory influenced not just Parliament, but courts as well. In a famous 1769 case, a
court found it “‘just’ that an author should reap the profits of his ingenuity.” Seville, supra note
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In sum, the path of copyright history follows the milestones of human
creativity. Whether seen as a natural right—or even at its human apogee as a
human right as the next Section demonstrates—or as an economic incentive,
the focus of copyright has been the production of the human mind. At
a policy junction early in the eighteenth century, copyright chose to
acknowledge authors, not publishers. If copyright had been designed as an
investment protection scheme, or merely a scheme to disseminate “things of
value,” then the investment of publishers would have been sufficient, human
creativity a mere adjunct, and the basis for protection would have been time
and money spent.123 This would have paved a path to argue in favor of the
protection of machine productions, based on the time and money spent on
the machines and their code. Yet in 1991 the Supreme Court, following in
almost three centuries of normativity centered on human authorship,
unequivocally threw the investment and time (“sweat of the brow”) test
overboard and anchored the copyright ship solidly in the waters of human
creativity.124
3. Author’s Rights as Human Rights
The theory of authorship just described reached a higher level still due
to the influence on the European continent as the prototypical Romantic
Author became the model on which much of the more modern copyright
system was built.125 The Romantic Author was, to quote Michel Foucault, “[a]
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas.”126

117, at 180. The case, Millar v. Taylor, confirmed the existence of a “common law-right of authors”
in their “literary property,” ostensibly based on natural law considerations. Millar v. Taylor (1769)
98 Eng. Rep. 201, 202, 206, 229; 4 Burr. 2303, 2304, 2355. However, a later case, Donaldson v.
Beckett, found that this right had not survived the adoption of the Statute of Anne. See generally
Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837; 4 Burr. 2408. Copyright, if it is “considered a
natural right . . . [of authors] at common law,” then “the right, like most common law property
rights, should be perpetual.” Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522,
529 (2000). This debate is reminiscent of recent discussions in the United States on the common
law right in sound recordings and its interface with (federal) copyright law in the wake of the
adoption of the Classics Protection and Access Act (“Classics Act”). Orrin G. Hatch–Bob
Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-264, §§ 201–202, 132 Stat. 3676,
3728. The Classics Act extended federal (statutory) protection to pre-1972 sound recordings. In
a 2011 letter to the President, the Register of Copyrights had noted that “[u]nder current law,
sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972 are protected under federal copyright law,
but recordings fixed before that date are protected by a patchwork of state statutory and common
law.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 4 (2011).
123. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
124. See infra Section V.A.1.
125. Romanticism is considered to have started in the eighteenth century and peaked during
the first half of the nineteenth century. For more discussion, see generally MATTHEW JOSEPHSON,
VICTOR HUGO: A REALISTIC BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT ROMANTIC (1942).
126. Foucault, supra note 121, at 141.
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There was no doubt at the time that European authors had natural rights
in works produced by them, a view that was given “universal” status when it
was enshrined as a human right.127 The Universal Declaration on Human
Rights (“UDHR”) protects the moral and material interests of authors
resulting from scientific, literary or artistic production.128 This protection of
interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic production objectively
embraces at least indirectly the Lockean approach.129 To quote Professor Julie
Cohen, copyright’s “mission to foster cultural play” can be read against the
backdrop of the UDHR.130 While the copyright protection of the output of
machines can be the subject of an honest debate, no one can seriously argue
that machines should have human rights.131
With the U.K. and the rest of Europe both basing a new form of
(intellectual) property on authorship, the next step was to internationalize
the protection. After all, natural rights should know no geographical
boundaries (as their recognition as human rights demonstrates).132 The

127. Those rights are not coextensive with current copyright rules, and they are balanced by
a right to access and participate in cultural productions. See Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights
and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations Into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 519 (2004); see also HUGH C. HANSEN, 10 INTELLECTUAL LAW
AND POLICY 401 (2008) (“Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration establishes the status of the
material and the moral rights of the author as human rights.”).
128. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
129. As Swiss copyright scholar François Dessemontet noted, “[T]he Universal Declaration
and the UN Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted on 16 December 1966]
mark the apex of the French vision of literary and artistic property, as opposed to the
Anglo-American ‘mercantilist’ view.” François Dessemontet, Copyright and Human Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM
113, 114 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M Mom eds., 1998).
130. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 103 (2012).
Also relevant is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
arts. 15(1)(b)–(c), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (recognizing a right
“[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the author” and “[t]o enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications”). For a discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1020 (2007).
131. See, e.g., Fiona de Londras, Saadi v. Italy, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 616, 619 (2008) (quoting
European Court of Human Rights Judge Zupancic, discussing the “humanness of human rights”);
see also George J. Annas, The Man on the Moon, Immortality, and Other Millennial Myths: The Prospects
and Perils of Human Genetic Engineering, 49 EMORY L.J. 753, 753 (2000) (“[H]uman rights and
human dignity depend on our human nature. . . .”); James M. Donovan, Human Rights: From Legal
Transplants to Fair Translation, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 475, 484 (2017) (“Human rights enjoy popular
endorsement because they are thought to be obvious, even self-evident consequences of
humanness.”). Perhaps one day there will be a Bill of Machine Rights.
132. Authors’ rights, as natural or human rights, should be protected in all countries without
discrimination, a principle known as national treatment. That was the basic premise of the 1886
text of the Convention, namely to ensure that authors who were nationals of countries that would
accede to the new treaty would be protected in all countries party to the treaty. See WORLD INTELL.
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internationalization of the rights of authors as natural rights took the form of
the Berne Convention, the seed of which was sown in the 1850s by ALAI, a
Paris-based association of writers.133 ALAI’s first president was the famous
French author and human rights campaigner Victor Hugo,134 perhaps bestknown today for Les Misérables (1862) but in his day famous also as an advocate
for the Romantic Movement associated on the Continent with the natural
rights foundation of authors’ rights.135 The basis for the protection of rights
of authors was, in his view, the needs of the “human spirit” to grow and
develop, a notion that can be put in parallel with that of progress.136
4. Evolution of Authors’ Rights in the United States
For American authors of the late eighteenth and up to the early
nineteenth century, fostering creative genius meshed with concurrent
interests in preserving and maintaining a cultural commons.137 American
thinkers and authors at the time sought to articulate and codify competing
visions of selfhood in the increasingly important print culture.
Their thinking, and the discussion of the natural rights of authors,
directly influenced the text of the U.S. Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, who

PROP. ORG., 1886–1986: BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY 119 (1986), available at https://
www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/877/wipo_pub_877.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2NZ53RJ].
133. The original text of the Berne Convention was signed in 1886, based on negotiations
that started in the 1850s in the wake of the Romantic wave. For a detailed history of that
Convention, see generally JOSEPHSON, supra note 125; and RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note
88. The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989. See WIPO-Administered Treaties:
Contracting Parties > Berne Convention, supra note 88.
The association’s full official name is Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale
(“ALAI”). See ALAI, http://www.alai.org [https://perma.cc/QL48-X2UF].
134. As President of ALAI, Hugo was instrumental in the early draft of the Berne Convention.
One should note, to offer a more accurate picture, that Hugo’s views changed over time. See
Calvin D. Peeler, From the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 IND.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 423, 450–51 (1999).
135. The prototypical Romantic Author is the model on which much of the early
international copyright edifice was built. Romanticism is considered to have started in the
eighteenth century and peaked during the first half of the nineteenth century. The Berne
Convention was signed in 1886, based on negotiations that started in the 1850s in the wake of
the Romantic wave. See supra note 133.
136. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. The quote (author’s translation) can be
found at: Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions and
Limitations, 5 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 5 (2008) (“[L]iterature was the government of
humankind by the human spirit.”). In the original text: “La littérature, c’est le gouvernement du
genre humain par l’esprit humain.” Victor Hugo, Discours d’ouverture du Congrès littéraire
international de 1878.
137. As legal scholars such as L. Ray Patterson have pointed out, the language of the
Constitution suggests, in order of priority, that copyright first promotes learning, then preserves
the public domain, and—only thirdly—encourages creation by benefiting the author. See L. RAY
PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 49
–50 (1991).
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was U.S. Minister to France from 1785 to 1789, witnessed the evolution of
authors’ rights as human rights.138 “In [The Federalist] No. 43, Madison argued
that the proposed federal government should have exclusive jurisdiction over
copyright law” (thus superseding the statutes that most of the colonies already
had adopted based on the Statute of Anne).139 Recall that common law
copyright, with which Madison would have been familiar, was a property-like
right anchored in natural law.140 In Madison’s view, that power would “scarcely
be questioned” arguing that “[t]he copyright of authors has been solemnly
adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law.”141 Madison “proposed
to his fellow delegates that Congress be empowered ‘[t]o secure to literary
authors their copyrights for a limited time.’”142 This author-centric strategy to
justify copyright put the “cultural figuration” of the author at the center of
the picture.143
Modernism eventually pushed Romanticism out of the normative
spotlight. Modernist authors were different: British and American alike, they
made use of an array of existing literary materials in their work, embracing
techniques such as collage, pastiche, and complex patterns of allusions even
138. See JAY FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, & THE
CULTURE OF PERFORMANCE 64–65 (1993) (explaining how Jefferson saw a difference between
authors who referred to the “infallible sources” (reason, history and vox dei) whose texts were
“harmonious, vatic, and by implication ‘true’,” and authors who “innovated,” and noting that
Jefferson’s name appeared (among others) on the original draft of the Declaration of
Independence which were later removed).
139. Edward L. Carter, Choking the Channel of Public Information: Re-Examination of an
Eighteenth-Century Warning About Copyright and Free Speech, 1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 79,
84 (2011).
140. See supra note 122.
141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Commentators have suggested that Madison, who was most likely familiar with Millar v. Taylor (see
supra note 122) might not have known that a later court had found that the Statute of Anne had
established the common law right of authors. See Carter, supra note 139, at 85 (“[T]he 1783
edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, which would have contained a report of Donaldson, may not
have been available to colonial lawyers until after the Revolutionary War, and so American
colonists may have continued to apply the precedent of Millar v. Taylor long after British judges
had abandoned it in Donaldson.”); Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost Our Moral Rights and the Door
Closed on Non-Economic Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 21–22 (2005);
Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an
Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public’s Control of Government, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 110 n.659 (noting
that Madison, in The Federalist No. 43, “may have been misled because his Blackstone was
printed before the outcome of Donaldson v. Beckett.”).
142. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2375 (2003) (citing
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 325 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
143. See ROSE, supra note 85, at 2 (“Copyright is founded on the concept of the unique
individual who creates something original and is entitled to reap a profit from those labors. Until
recently, the dominant modes of aesthetic thinking have shared the romantic and individualistic
assumptions inscribed in copyright.”); see also Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary
Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 294 (1992) (“[P]ractices of
writing and reading have been organized around the idea of the ‘author.’”).
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as they continued to pay homage to the author as “original genius.”144 But the
author remained front and center.145 Until, that is, Foucault announced that
the dagger of post-structuralism had stabbed at the very heart of authorship.146
A major “critique of copyright law by Martha Woodmansee, Peter Jaszi,
James Boyle, and others . . . (very simplified) is that nothing is genuinely
creative and innovative; everyone just reworks the commons.”147 The “death
of the author” argument has been used not just to weaken copyright
protection but also, in an ironic twist, to argue that machine productions can
and should be protected.148 As Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss contends, however,
“[p]erhaps concepts like authorship and creativity are socially constructed
and bear little relationship to what actually goes on in the process of
innovation, but these constructs have mediated fairly effectively with
production problems over several centuries.”149
The post-modern burial of the author does not justify the conclusion that
machine productions are somehow just as worthy of copyright protection
as those of human authors. True, authorship is now more collective and
collaborative; but that is a mere constatation.150 This Article does not dispute
the diminishment of the role of the monolithic individualized “figure of the
romantic author.”151 Stating that the role of individual authors has diminished
eludes the question that needs to be answered because to say that authors
cross-fertilize each other in new ways and create more often jointly or by
derivation from one another—a phenomenon evidenced by the exponential
growth of user-generated content—is simply not evidence, in this Article’s
view, that collaboration between humans and machines can be laid on the same
reasoning pedestal. Put differently, a broadening of the nature and scope of
human interactions does not naturally lead to the conclusion that, therefore,

144.

See Paul K. Saint-Amour, Introduction: Modernism and the Lives of Copyright, in MODERNISM
(Paul K. Saint-Amour ed., 2011).
145. Ezra Pound, arguably the most prominent and public of the Moderns when it came to
politics, engaged in extended meditations on copyright and its relation to the creative process.
Pound’s international copyright law protected authors’ intellectual labour by codifying perpetual
and automatic copyright. See Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound, Legislator: Perpetual Copyright and Unfair
Competition with the Dead, in MODERNISM AND COPYRIGHT, supra note 144, at 50–53.
146. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 101 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984) (describing
how the very “notion of ‘author’” was but a moment in the “history of ideas, knowledge [and]
literature”).
147. Dreyfuss, supra note 119, at 1214 (citation omitted); see also Jaszi, supra note 143, at 319
(“[E]lectronic technology is playing a crucial role in promoting writing practices in which the
identities of individual contributors to shared dynamic texts are deemphasized, and their useful
contributions effectively merged.”).
148. See Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 3, 7.
149. Dreyfuss, supra note 119, at 1216.
150. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 34, at 196–213 (describing wikis and “collaborative hybrids”
as newer forms of creation).
151. James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider
Trading, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 1413, 1421 (1992).
AND COPYRIGHT 1, 31
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collaboration with machines is now encompassed under the same normative
umbrella.
Professor Denicola and others have used the “supernatural” cases to
argue that authorship need not be human.152
The notion of creativity normatively embedded in copyright law since its
very origin has inexorably been linked to the human mind. A number of legal
scholars and philosophers often associate agency and mental states, what Kant
called “transcendental unity of apperception,” which one might define as
the ability to experience first-person self-consciousness, an interiority that
transcends mere observable behavior.153 Asking if AI machines can create
might be asking, in their view, whether AI machines have mental states or
free will. To a certain degree, this poses a circular definitional problem: If
“mental” is defined in human terms, then AI machines cannot, by definition,
have mental states or agency. This Article takes a more functionalist
approach.154 The underlying premise of the notion of agency is encapsulated
in the words “task” and “action” in the preceding quotes: As an agent acts, it
causes (by its action in performing its task) a difference in the world. As
Rebecca Tushnet noted, “creativity is a positive virtue, not just because of its
results but because of how the process of making meaning contributes to
human flourishing.”155 One can add a layer to this argument, namely that
creativity is a way for humans to communicate with one another. As Professors
Craig and Kerr opined:
152. See Denicola, supra note 5, at 278–81. The article refers to cases where a human author
claims to be a mere intermediary for a nonhuman entity, including Urantia Found. v. Maaherra,
114 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1997); Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full
Endeavor, Ltd., No. 96 CIV. 4126(RWS), 2000 WL 1028634, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000); and
Oliver v. Saint Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296, 297 (S.D. Cal. 1941). There is dicta in Penguin
Books that seems to support this view: “[D]ictation from a non-human source should not be a bar
to copyright.” Penguin Books, 2000 WL 1028634, at *12. However, in all the cases a human was
found to be the source of the written expression. This is the conclusion of a comparative laws
study of cases of this nature. See Denicola, supra note 5, at 281 n.190 (quoting Roger Syn,
© Copyright God: Enforcement of Copyright in the Bible and Religious Works, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 24
(2001)).
153. Gianmarco Veruggio & Keith Abney, Roboethics: The Applied Ethics for a New Science, in
ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 347, 354–55 (Patrick Lin
et al. eds., 2012). This is more clearly the case in if one follows a “relational” definition of the law
based on a legal subject’s decision to follow the law, or not. See also Keith Culver, Leaving the Hart
–Dworkin Debate, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 367, 378 (2001) (referring to “committed participant[s] in
some system of norms . . . [who] use norms as shared standards of conduct”). See generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining how people see law from an internal
point of view).
154. See WILLIAM G. LYCAN, CONSCIOUSNESS 8 (1987) (“We may hold onto our anti-Cartesian
claim . . . [and] we would do better to individuate mental types more abstractly, in terms (let us
say) of the functional riles their tokens paly in mediating between stimuli and responses.”); see
also Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1264–69
(1992) (discussing the objection that machines cannot have consciousness or intentionality).
155. Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 513, 537 (2009).
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To say authorship is human, that it is fundamentally connected with
humanness, is not to invoke the romantic author, and nor is it to
impose a kind of chauvinism that privileges human-produced
artifacts over those that are machine-made. Rather, it is to say that
human communication is the very point of authorship as a social
practice; indeed, as a condition of life. As such, we do not think we
are being at all romantic when we say: authorship is properly the
preserve of the human.156
To put it differently, authorship was a form of communication from
human to human (H->H), what Craig and Kerr refer to as “the authorship as a
dialogic and communicative act.”157 True, when computer software became
protected as a literary work, what was a set of instructions for a machine to
perform a task (i.e., H->M) was also recognized as authorship, at least for
copyright protection, but arguably the human expression embodied in the
code means that the execution of that code by the machine could
communicate that expression to human users.158 Now, we are discussing a
third, novel scenario, M->H, one in which the machine communicates with
us—and we may not know whether the communication signal was created by
human or machine.159
In sum, the human author, whether portrayed as a pauper toiling away
under the pale light of a dying candle with fingerless gloves, or a group of
savvy videographers expertly modifying images and sounds for their latest
YouTube channel, is (still) central to the copyright equation.160
B. WITH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES
The emergence of rights vested in authors in and since the Statute of
Anne has a second normative payoff: It undergirds, as we shall now see, a

156. Carys Craig & Ian Kerr, The Death of the AI Author 42 (Mar. 25, 2019) (unpublished
symposium paper), available at https://robots.law.miami.edu/2019/wp-content/uploads/2019/
03/Kerr_Death-of-AI-Author.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR62-4L5V].
157. Id. at 7.
158. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 127 (2000) (“The [Supreme] Court
in White-Smith . . . ruled that the piano roll did not infringe the copyright because it did not
communicate with a human being.”).
159. See Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 12 (“Copyright law has come to require so little in the
way of creativity from human authors that it is worth asking whether it makes sense to require
more of machines, particularly in instances where it is impossible to tell whether the work in
question was produced manually by a person or procedurally by generative computer code.”). In
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court held that the
person using a camera (to take a picture of Oscar Wilde) was making the creative choices
necessary to be the author of the photograph and thus it was not a machine-produced work. It is
beyond cavil that the photograph was meant to communicate to other humans.
160. For the Dickensian image of the pauper with fingerless gloves, see SAMANTHA SILVA, MR.
DICKENS AND HIS CAROL 255 (2017).
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second point used by the Article to illuminate the path ahead when it comes
to machine productions.
A set of arguments in England at the time of the Statute of Anne was that,
if authors had an obligation not to write libelous, defamatory or otherwise
unacceptable content (which they had), then authors should have a
coextensive right in their writings.161 This created a normative link that seems
entirely convincing to this Article: If one is responsible for one’s writing, then one
can legitimately ask for a right in protecting moral or material interests in that
writing.162 For example, one might want one’s name associated with the text,
or have a right to prevent its misappropriation (such as republication under
someone else’s name) as a form of plagiarism or as copyright infringement
(unauthorized copy) or both. This linkage between right and responsibility
was actively pursued by author advocates and reinforced by a freedom of
expression argument. Following in the footsteps of Milton and Locke, British
satirist Daniel Defoe argued that prepublication control was unnecessary; that
copyright should be granted to all authors and that their content could be
controlled by prosecuting “offenders” after publication; ex post control as
opposed to ex ante licensing, in other words.163 Defoe’s argument rests on the
complementarity of responsibility and right, punishment and reward.164 The same can
be found in Foucault’s discussion of the persona of the author: He puts in
parallel authorship and what he calls “penal appropriation,” noting that
“[t]exts, books, and discourses really began to have authors . . . to the extent
that authors became subject to punishment, that is, to the extent that
discourses could be transgressive.”165
This Article suggests that the same doctrinal linkage applies to machine
productions: If it served as the normative underpinning justifying copyright
for human authors, it should be applied to machine created productions, that

161.
162.

See ROSE, supra note 85, at 34–35.
Echoing the ICESCR, supra note 130. See BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS
1226–29 (2014) (describing rights of authors as human rights, and human rights as
“fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements”).
As of March 2020, the Covenant had 170 parties. The United States signed (but did not
ratify) the Covenant in 1977. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND
&mtdsg_no=IV3&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/6FFD-H7AL].
A human rights-based approach can inform parts of copyright law, but in the past two
decades copyright law at the international level has been shaped more by trade agreements than
human rights. See Daniel Gervais, Human Rights and the Philosophical Foundations of Intellectual
Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89, 90–93
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2015).
163. As he wrote: “‘Twould be unaccountably severe, to make a Man answerable for the
Miscarriages of a thing which he shall not reap the benefit of if well perform’d.” The quote can
be found in ROSE, supra note 85, at 35.
164. See id. at 35–36.
165. Foucault, supra note 121, at 148.
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is, to any other category of purported “author.” This Article cannot, therefore,
agree with the suggestion that copyright rights should be recognized in the
outcome of deep learning processes that generate productions that look like
copyrightable subject matter, at least not until and unless the machine,
as purported “author” (as a matter of copyright law), can accept full
responsibility for “its” creation.166 Furthermore, this conclusion can be
anchored in the well-established correlativity thesis (“no rights without
responsibilities”) essential to rights theory.167
Will liability by proxy fill this gap? Will programmers, owners or users of
AI machines accept responsibility for all potential acts of the machines they
program, own or use, including all literary and artistic outputs?168 This Article
suggests it is safer to answer in the negative. Yet, if programmers, owners, and
users of AI machines claim rights in the productions made by those machines,
those programmers, owners and users must accept responsibility for those
productions, whether they amount to copyright infringement, libel or any
other source of liability.169 Whether liability might arise should not be the
central inquiry. Instead, what matters is answering this question: what if there
was; would the owner or user be liable? This is a central normative point,
anchored in copyright history: No copyright should be granted to an author
who is not also responsible for the work’s meaning and content, whether it be
libel or copyright infringement.
The reader may have noted that the previous paragraphs eschew a
difficulty by referring to the programmer, owner or user.170 Indeed, deciding
which of them is the potential “author” is fact-dependent and thus no uniform
166. The idea to create this type of second-degree incentive is not uncommon. See Ryan
Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1079, 1081 (2016) (arguing that inventions need not be made by humans to be patentable and
extending the reasoning to copyrightable material).
167. See Keith Abney, Robotics, Ethical Theory, and Metaethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, in ROBOT
ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 35, 39 (Patrick Lin et al. eds.,
2012).
168. Recall, in addition, that there is no evidence to suggest that copyright in the output
might be the best or even a good incentive for AI programmers. Presumably, meeting the needs
of prospective buyers will work just as well, and possibly much better. See Wu, supra note 54, at
162–63.
169. This scenario might arise even without an AI machine, as a simple example illuminates.
Take a computer program generating random associations of words according to basic syntactic
rules. It might produce a text that is libelous or infringing someone else’s copyright.
It has been said that an army of computers (or monkeys) creating random texts would
eventually produce a copy of a Shakespearean play, but they would most likely produce something
libelous well before they generated a copy of Hamlet. See Jesse Anderson, A Few Million Monkeys
Randomly Recreate Shakespeare, JESSE ANDERSON (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.jesse
-anderson.com/2011/09/a-few-million-monkeys-randomly-recreate-shakespeare [https://
perma.cc/GD77-4LNK].
170. This is, of course, a debate that must be had if a decision was made that non-human
productions should be protected. For a discussion on possible allocation(s) of rights in that
context, see generally Samuelson, supra note 36.
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answer can be provided. If human authorship of machine productions is
recognized, then it should probably be to the human proxy “author” who
effectively operated or otherwise asked or allowed the machine to produce.171
This assumes that we are past the binary paradigm described above, namely
that the machine produces either (a) only what it was programmed to
produce, or (b) is a mere tool assisting an identifiable human author.172 In
other words, this assumes at least a significant part of autonomous creation by
the machine.173 Because this Article takes the view that, once the autonomy
threshold has been crossed, there should be no copyright in the production,
it is unnecessary to delve more deeply into which human proxy should be, by
legal fiction, “selected” as the most appropriate right holder.174
V. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROTECTION
As noted in the Introduction, the humanness of authorship can be
derived from both doctrinal and normative arguments. In this Part, the Article
considers two doctrinal arguments, namely the requirement of originality and
the notion of derivative work.
Is the humanness of the creation of copyrighted works a chasse gardée
of humans? In her analysis of the copyright laws of seven major jurisdictions,
including the United States, Professor Jane Ginsburg concluded that an
author was the “human being who exercises subjective judgment in
composing the work and who controls its execution.”175 The search for the
manifestation of that subjective judgement is encapsulated in the originality
doctrine to which the Article now turns its attention.
A. ORIGINALITY
The only condition to obtain copyright, both in the United States and
around the world, is that a work of authorship must be “original.”176 The
171. See id.
172. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 15. To use the term in Ginsburg & Budiardjo, the production is
“authorless.” Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 66, at 343.
175. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1063, 1066 (2003).
176. The Copyright Act grants protection only to “original works of authorship.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2012). The Supreme Court has held that originality is required by the constitutional
provision Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which permits Congress to protect the “Writings” of
“Authors.” See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (following the
logic of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) when stating that “it [was]
unmistakably clear that the[se] terms,” “authors” and “writings” in the Constitution, “presuppose
a degree of originality”). In the United States the work must also be “fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
As to the worldwide application, see Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative
Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 981 (2002)
(“There thus seems to be emerging an international consensus that originality is not only
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requirement is, as the Supreme Court described it, “[t]he sine qua non of
copyright.”177 The question for our purposes is, how much humanness does
this requirement presuppose?
1. Creative Choices
The legislative history of the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act shows that
originality is required for a literary or artistic production to be protected by
copyright.178 Prior to 1976, originality was not explicitly mentioned in the Act
but it was nonetheless required.179 The question of the exact definition of the
standard remained open, however. In 1991, the Feist Court found that creative
choices visible in selection and arrangement were necessary to generate sufficient
originality to warrant copyright protection.180 This reasoning echoed earlier
Supreme Court cases dealing with photographs.181 In Burrow-Giles, for
example, the Court had to decide whether a photograph of Oscar Wilde was
original.182 In concluding that it was, the Court noted the creative choices
made by the photographer, including pose, costume, lighting, accessories,
and the set itself.183

copyright’s single ‘sieve,’ but also, and more importantly, that the presence of creative choices in
the making of the work is the only adequate test to determine whether the work is worthy of
copyright protection.”).
177. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
178. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). “The . . . Act does not . . . define originality” and
this omission was apparently deliberate. See William Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Reply,
6 COMM. & L. 11, 18 (1984).
179. See Julia Reytblat, Is Originality in Copyright Law a “Question of Law” or a “Question of Fact?”:
The Fact Solution, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 183 (1999).
180. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite originality. The
compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place
them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by
readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the
copyright laws.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact,
Opinion and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791, 794–95 (2001) (explaining
the distinction between “creation” choices and “discovery” choices).
181. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–51 (1903); BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884). Several lower courts have adopted
a similar approach. See, e.g., Gentieu v. John Muller & Co., 712 F. Supp. 740, 742–44 (W.D. Mo.
1989); Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1891); see also Patricia L. Baade,
Photographer’s Rights: Case for Sufficient Originality Test in Copyright Law, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 149,
150–53 (1996) (discussing the “originality in copyrighted expression in photography generally”).
182. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 54–55.
183. Id. at 60; see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (finding that a work of
authorship must evidence “the creative powers of the mind”); YSOLDE GENDREAU ET AL.,
COPYRIGHT AND PHOTOGRAPHS: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 305–06 (Ysolde Gendreau et al. eds.,
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The question before the Feist Court was basically to determine what
copyright law should reward: work, investment, or creativity? The Court found
that creativity was required by the Intellectual Property Clause, which states
that Congress has jurisdiction over copyright (and patent) law “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors . . . exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”184
A few years earlier in Sony, the Court had explained that the benefits of
copyright are “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access
to the products of their genius.”185 By requiring the mark of creativity, rather
than looking at the work, time, or money invested in the creation process, the
Supreme Court clarified the need for a creative consideration that society can
expect from its bargain with the author, and explained that copyright is not
an investment protection scheme.186
The notion of creative choices in Feist can be summarized as follows: A
choice187 is creative if made independently by the author and that is not dictated188 by

1999) (discussing Burrow-Giles and the Supreme Court’s “emphasis on creativity” with respect to
copyrights for photographs).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added); Feist, 499 U.S. at 346, 349. Though it
requires some creativity, the originality threshold is low. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362 (“The standard of
originality is low, but it does exist.”).
185. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
186. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 357–58. For an interesting discussion of the relationship between
the author and her work, and how the work is expressed, see Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost:
Idea and Expression in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1221, 1248–50 (1993).
187. The term “choice” is used here in the usual sense, namely an act or instance of choosing
from among a number of available possibilities. See Choice, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1989), https://oed.com/view/Entry/32111?rskey=z6voTy&result=1eid [https://perma.cc
/2P2H-MT26] (“The act of choosing; preferential determination between things proposed . . . .”).
188. This terminology was used in CDN Inc. v. Kapes, a case that interpreted Feist rather
narrowly. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999). It was also in the famous
decision for Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., but in a different context, namely
the idea/expression dichotomy:
Professor Nimmer suggests, and we endorse, a ‘successive filtering method’ for
separating protectable expression from non-protectable material. This process
entails examining the structural components at each level of abstraction to
determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was dictated
by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea;
required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain
and hence is nonprotectable expression.
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
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the function of the work,189 the method190 or technique used, or by applicable
standards191 or relevant good practice.192 Purely random, arbitrary or
insignificant193 selection is insufficient.194 The exclusion of choices dictated
by the function of the work is an expression of the test of “practical
inevitability” found in Feist: If function dictates the course to be followed,
there is no room for creativity. From a copyright standpoint, therefore, the
result is indeed “inevitable.”195

189. Similar to the numbering system that served as a shorthand description of the relevant
characteristics of each fastener described in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,
Southco uses product numbers that convey specific properties of the products
manufactured. The numbers are not assigned at random or in sequence; they are
assigned based on the properties of the parts. The Numbering System is a complex
code expressing numerous detailed features of Southco hardware products; each
part number tells the story of a part’s size, finish, and utility.
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (quoting
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-4337, 2000 WL 21257, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
“Under this system, each fastener is assigned a unique nine-digit number, with each digit
describing a specific physical parameter of the fastener.” Id. at 149 (footnote omitted). The
‘market’ may, by extension, be considered as a ‘functional requirement’ if what is required is so
clear as not to leave room for creativity. See, e.g., Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115
F.3d 1509, 1520 n.31 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The mere discovery of an organizing principle which is
dictated by the market is not sufficient to establish creativity.”).
190. In the sense of the creation method. The creation of a method (e.g., to present facts)
would be copyrightable. See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1346
(5th Cir. 1994); see also Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 46 F.3d 408, 409 (5th
Cir. 1995) (opinion supplemented on denial of rehearing).
191. Or “garden-variety” variations on a theme. Feist, 499 U.S. at 362; see also Perma
Greetings, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 445, 448 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (“Clichéd
language, phrases and expressions conveying an idea that is typically expressed in a limited
number of stereotypic fashions, are not subject to copyright protection.”).
192. Victor Lalli Enters., Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991) (“In
Lalli’s charts, as Judge Glasser correctly found, he arranges factual data according to ‘purely
functional grids that offer no opportunity for variation.’ The format of the charts is a convention:
Lalli exercises neither selectivity in what he reports nor creativity in how he reports it.”).
193. Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). This case was blended in with Feist by the Fifth Circuit in Engineering
Dynamics:
[T]he input/output formats fail to satisfy the Feist-Zack Meyer originality test. In Feist,
the Supreme Court held that an alphabetically arranged phone book lacks the
creativity and originality necessary to sustain a copyright. In [the Zack Meyer case],
this circuit held that boilerplate contractual language printed on a blank form was
insufficiently original.
Eng’g Dynamics, Inc., 26 F.3d at 1345.
194. See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (10th Cir. 1997).
195. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363.
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2. Application to Machine Productions
AI machines can undoubtedly choose; they make decisions.196 The
(copyright) question that lies beneath this factual statement is whether those
choices can be considered creative. The answer is in two parts, both stemming
from Feist. First, to be creative, following Feist, choices must not be unduly
constrained or dictated by consideration of efficiency, functionality,
applicable standards and practices, which would seem to exclude many
choices made by machines.197 Second, the role of the labor and time invested
in the creation of a work, previously captured under the “sweat of the brow”
test, was jettisoned in Feist.198
Applied to determine whether machine productions are creative because
they look like they result from a creative process, the test leads to a negative
answer.199 Answering in the affirmative would amount to a “copyright Turing
test,” such as the one designed by Ray Kurzweil to prove that human adults
could tell the difference between human and machine authored poetry only
53 percent of the time, slightly better than the default (50/50) odds.200 Poetry

196. See supra note 72.
197. In deciding that models of human torsos were devoid of protection, the Fourth Circuit
used a reasoning that seems directly applicable to machines:
[T]he fact that the creator of the torsos was driven by utilitarian concerns
. . . deprived the human torsos of copyright protection. This process-oriented approach
. . . —focusing on the process of creating the object to determine whether it is
entitled to copyright protection— . . . reconciles the earlier case law . . . .
Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 930 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis
added).
198. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359–60. Lower courts have used this two-part test regularly to deny
protection to functionally designed objects. Two examples should suffice to illustrate the point.
The Tenth Circuit refused copyright protection to 3D-printed models of Toyota cars even though
the copies required a considerable investment of both time and money. See Meshwerks, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 2008) (“This is not to say that
[accurately reproducing an underlying image] requires no skill or effort; it simply means that
such skill and effort does not suffice to invoke the highly advantageous legal monopoly granted
under the Copyright Act.” (alteration in original) (quoting with approval Mary Campbell Wojcik,
The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 257, 267 (2008))). Conversely, in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp., Allen-Myland argued that portions of computer code that were added to an existing IBM
program lacked originality because programming choices were dictated by earlier programming
choices. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1011–12 (E.D. Pa.
1991). The court found that there were creative choices because IBM’s programmers had to pick
from several possibilities for both the structure and the data, and not just by following
functionality considerations. Id.
199. For a proposal along those lines, see Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 919, 942–43 (2012); and see also Samuelson, supra note 36, at 1196–97 (“If a machine
does compose something, such as a piece of music, and it is impossible to tell by hearing the
music whether it was composed by a computer or by a human, one might wonder whether the
notion of machine authorship ought to be accepted.”).
200. See Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 16. The original Turing test was a set of questions
asked via teletype on any subject whatsoever. Both the human being and the machine attempted
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has a freer form and a broader range of expected outcomes than many forms
of creation, however. One wonders if a short story or novel would get similar
numbers.201 It strikes this Article as poor normative grounding to say that a
machine can, in some respects, “pass for creative”—copyright “passing off,” as
it were—and that machine productions should, therefore, be protected.202
Professor Joseph Fishman has argued that the creation process matters,
inter alia in infringement analyses, suggesting that laborious copying, for
example in an art class setting, should not be treated in the same way as
making a photocopy.203 This Article agrees and argues, further, that a proper
focus on process provides an important doctrinal clue to separate human and
machine. It is not enough for a machine to pass itself off as human in one of
its outputs to justify generating the same rights as human activity would; the
creation process must be human.
In summary, the normative rationales to provide protection are
essentially absent in the case of machine productions.204 Copyright is a legal
mechanism designed to help produce works that are the result of a human
creative process; the incentive is for humans to engage in the process not
knowing whether the result will be a blank page or the Great American Novel.
Moreover, the machine has no liability and should be granted no right in
productions for which it cannot be held liable.205
In light of the above, this Article concludes that, doctrinally, machines
cannot make creative choices as those were defined in Feist. They can certainly
produce new material, but that is not relevant from a copyright perspective for
copyright does not require novelty; it requires independent creation of works
to convince the questioner that it or she is the human and the other is not. See Solum, supra note
154, at 1236.
201. The objective might be set lower, namely “to generate stories that would be regarded as
creative, even if these stories are well below what a muse-inspired member of Homo sapiens sapiens
can muster.” SELMER BRINGSJORD & DAVID A. FERRUCCI, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LITERARY
CREATIVITY: INSIDE THE MIND OF BRUTUS, A STORYTELLING MACHINE 17 (2000).
202. Bridy, Evolution, supra note 3, at 399. Building machines that act in a way that appear to
be creative would be a significant enough step. BRINGSJORD & FERRUCCI, supra note 201, at 32.
“Passing off” is a notion borrowed from trademark law defined as “when a producer misrepresents
his or her own goods or services as those of another producer.” Laura Gasaway, Origin of Goods in
Trademark Law Does Not Mean Creator, 7 INFO. OUTLOOK 21, 21 (2003); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2012) (making it illegal to “cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
. . . origin” of goods or services); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,
27 n.1 (2003).
203. See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2015)
[hereinafter Fishman, Creating Around] (“[New copyrighted] works are the product of a
fundamental yet underappreciated fact about the creative process: it thrives best not under
complete freedom, but rather under a moderate amount of restriction.”); see also Joseph P.
Fishman, The Copy Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855, 860 (2016) (“Copyright doctrine ought to
borrow a page from trade secrecy doctrine by factoring the defendant’s copying process into the
infringement analysis.”).
204. See supra Part IV.
205. See supra Section IV.B.
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of authorship.206 Novelty is no irrebuttable evidence of Feistian creativity.207 A
machine could only be considered the creator of a work of authorship if it was
autonomous and made choices not preprogrammed in its software and not
entirely dictated by efficiency considerations, for that is, per Feist, what makes
them creative.208
3. Works Made for Hire?
The work-for-hire analysis, according to which the machine might be
analogized to an author “employed” to create, seems a simple and elegant
solution to identify a proxy human author and sidestep the originality
analysis.209 It flips the purpose of the doctrine on its head, however. The
purpose of the doctrine is to grant a person (often a legal person) the rights
in a work created by humans. Put differently, under the work-made-for-hire
doctrine, a human creation is said to have been authored, by operation of a
legal fiction, by another person, who need not be human.210 The prototypical
example is a motion picture to the creation of which a scriptwriter, director,
actors and many others have collaborated. If the film is a work made for hire,
the studio (producer) is the author under U.S. law.211 Attributing rights in a
machine-created work to a human (or other person) is arguably exactly the
opposite: It gives a non-human creation to a human (or other) person. In the
case of works-made-for hire, in other words, creative choices are made by a
human creator (an employee or commissioned author) even if the law
considers a corporate entity as the “author.”212 If, in contrast, a machine
owned by, say a film production company, produced scenes for a movie and
no credible link to the creativity of a human (user or programmer) could be

206. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”).
207. Id. (“Originality does not signify novelty.”).
208. See Miriam Bitton, Protection for Informational Works After Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 640 (2011)
(suggesting that “after Feist, some courts approach the question of original arrangement and
selection of a database with caution, suggesting that when the selection or arrangement is
dictated by functional considerations or where the criteria for selection or organization are
objective, copyright protection will be denied”).
209. This is the model proposed by Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 8, at 671, 708–16 (“I propose
that AI systems should be seen as the creative employee or self-contractor creators working for or
with the user—the firm, human, or other legal entity operating the AI system.”); see also Kalin
Hristov, Artificial Intelligence and the Copyright Dilemma, 57 IDEA 431, 445–47 (2017).
210. See Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 25 (noting that using the work-made-for-hire doctrine
in this context “avoids the predicament of vesting rights in a machine”).
211. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (providing that “the [hiring party] for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author”).
212. See id. § 101 (defining works made for hire as those “prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment; or [those] specially ordered or commissioned”).
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established, then the resulting production and its authorship would have no
human connection.213
Moreover the traditional work-made-for-hire scenario—as in the motion
picture example in the previous paragraph—does not break the right and
responsibility linkage.214 If an employee’s text or other copyrightable work,
created in the scope of her employment, is considered to be authored by the
employer, the employer would likely be liable if a court eventually found the
work to be libelous for example.215 The same is true outside a work-made-forhire context: The author of a libelous text may have copyright in that text, but
she is also liable for the tort, for copyright is no defense to libel.216
Bringing this discussion to its logical end, this Article concludes that if an
AI machine is programmed to “create,” it requires no ex ante legal incentive
or ex post reward for doing so. The argument that the programmer(s),
owner(s) or user(s) should get second-degree copyright (in the productions

213. Some scholars have used psychology and neuroscience-based arguments to suggest that
a machine cannot create in the same way as humans, or the opposite, namely that all creativity is
algorithmic. See supra note 3. This Article takes the view that both arguments are unconvincing.
The first is plainly circular: Creativity is human, a machine isn’t human, therefore it cannot
create. The second rests on an unprovable claim, namely that computers create using algorithms
and humans use something that can legally be analogized to algorithms, therefore human and machine
creativity are equal. Those debates strike this Article as interesting, but mostly misguided to
determine whether copyright applies to AI machine productions.
Because creativity has no accepted normative definition, various logically valid answers
can be offered to the proposition that machines are or are not “creative.” This Article recognizes
that research on creativity as a psychological phenomenon is valuable to guide policy makers in
designing proper (human) incentives. See Fishman, Creating Around, supra note 203, at 1341
(“Because it has proven so difficult to show a causal link between intellectual property incentives
and particular results on the ground, psychological research can at least inform policymakers
about how to encourage creative thinking.”); see also TURNER , supra note 18, at 122 (arguing that
depending on the definition adopted, AI machines can be seen as more or less creative than
humans); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1456–59
(2010) (arguing “that intellectual property law ought to care about the psychological process of
creativity in the arts and sciences”). See generally Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain:
Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (2010)
(explaining how intellectual property law reflects incorrect “commonly held stereotypes about
left-brain scientists versus right-brain artists”).
The point made here is straightforward: This research cannot answer conclusively as a
matter of law whether machines are, or are not, capable of “creativity.”
214. See supra Section IV.B.
215. See McKinney v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 797–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(employer is liable for employee’s defamation); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 73 Ga. App. 839,
840 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946) (employer liable for libel caused by injurious statements by employee);
Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389, 405–06 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (same); Lewis v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (employer liable for injury
caused by employee’s foreseeable republication of libelous statement); see also Charles S. Murray,
Jr., Compelled Self-Publication in the Employment Context: A Consistent Exception to the Defamation
Requirement of Publication, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 295, 319–20 (1988).
216. For a list of available affirmative defenses to libel actions, see 22 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3d Affirmative Defenses in Libel Actions 305 (1993).
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made by the machine) was rejected above.217 Moreover, the idea that
incentives should be created by giving, say, programmers exclusive rights on
the output—what is sometimes referred to as “indirect incentives”—opens a
dangerous door and extends exclusivity well beyond the normative reach of
copyright law’s protection of an author’s original expression.218
What remains is the possibility, in the distant future, that some sort of
incentive might be required to get an AI machine with multiple abilities to
spend more time creating as opposed to performing other tasks.219 This is no
doubt an interesting inquiry: Would financial incentives such as those
traditionally associated with copyright succeed in modifying machine
behavior?220
B. DERIVATIVE WORKS
A reasoning that has been used to justify copyright protection for
machine productions is that machines, like humans, derive their output from
pre-existing copyrighted works, as exemplified by the musical composition
and visual optimization algorithm modifying photographs mentioned in
the introductory paragraph of this Article.221 In common parlance, authors
“derive” when they base their work directly or indirectly on those of another,
as in the aphorism that we all stand on the shoulders of giants.222 Professor
Bridy, for example, has argued along those lines “all cultural production is
inherently derivative.”223 This argument is flawed and, properly applied, the
notion of derivative work argues against protection.

217. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
218. See Denicola, supra note 5, at 273 (“[A] work’s contribution to the public welfare does
not seem dependent on the process that produced it . . . . At least for now, the production of
computer-generated works requires human beings to develop, improve, distribute, and use the
computer technology and to disseminate the resulting output.”); see also ALESSIO CHIABOTTO,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OVER NON-HUMAN GENERATED CREATIONS 13 (2017), available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053772 [https://perma.cc/5QDU-LEK3] (“[T]he fact that
machines do not need incentives to generate output does not mean that no one needs incentive
for products of computer-based artificial intelligence. Thus, even in the case that no direct
incentive is needed, it could be necessary to give indirect incentives in order to reach the
copyright policy goals.”)
219. Andrew Wu has used the example of “Data” from Star Trek: The New Generation, as a
multifunctional android who might need to be encouraged “to spend more time creating artistic
works.” Wu, supra note 54, at 156.
220. This seems to presuppose a fact pattern not yet at hand. As technology stands now, we
can leave this question for another day.
221. See supra notes 4, 8.
222. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991) (attributing the shoulders of giants aphorism to Sir Isaac
Newton). One author traced the aphorism to Bernard de Chartres in the twelfth century. See
ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: THE POST-ITALIANATE EDITION 209–12
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1993) (1965).
223. Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 12.
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To say that creativity is derivative in a broad cultural sense—as with
memes, for example—is not the same as saying that all productions resulting
from the derivative creativity are derivative works.224 The notion of derivative
works is contained in the statute and must be used with caution.225 Many
derivate works include a copy of the underlying work, and most cases finding
that an infringement of the right to prepare a derivative work thus finds that
a parallel infringement of the right to reproduce the underlying work has also
occurred.226
After a detailed analysis of the right to prepare derivative works contained
in the statute,227 I concluded that what makes a work derivative for copyright
purposes is that the creative reuser “takes the creative choices that made the
primary work original.”228 For example, a translation of a novel may not
contain a single word from the expression in the original language, but it
reflects and reuses most of the choices of the author of the original work
(structure, flow, use of metaphors, style, etc.).229 A mashup, in contrast,
reproduces elements from pre-existing works and is derivative in that it reuses
creative choices of the author of the works it copies.230 The adaptation of a
novel to the screen may reuse expression (dialogues) but mostly transfers and
reuses creative choices from the novel, without taking the expression
wholesale.231 In a deep learning context, the computer does not derive in that
sense; instead it finds correlations and patterns to use as a matrix for its own
production.232 Those productions are not, therefore, derivate works.
A second crucial doctrinal point is that a derivative work, if it is to be protected
by copyright, must also be an original work of authorship.233 This explains why the
224. See Daniel Gervais, Authors, Online, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 385 (2015) (referring
to the Internet as a “Global Meme Factory”).
225. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) defines “[a] ‘derivative work’ [a]s a work based upon one
or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id.
§ 106(2) provides right holders in a work the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works.”
226. See Gervais, supra note 47, at 795–96 (explaining how courts tend to broaden the notion
of non-literal copying instead of relying on the separate right to prepare derivative works).
227. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
228. Gervais, supra note 47, at 808.
229. See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution, and the Need for Disclosure: A Study of
Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 83 (1994) (discussing how a good
translation requires reflecting the author’s creative choices).
230. See Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-Up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’ Interests Lost
Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 693 (2010) (“[M]ashup remixers are able to
appropriately use the works of artists to advance the arts . . . .”).
231. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (referring to a “motion picture version” in the definition of derivative works).
232. See supra notes 23–24.
233. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); see Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative
Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1690 (“In order to
be a derivative, the derived work must fully qualify for a copyright on its own. Thus, the § 102(a)
requirements of originality must be met.”).
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notion of derivative work provides an argument against, not for, protection.234
The author of the derivative work must “add original expression to each
derivative work in order to qualify it for copyright protection of its own.”235
This takes us back to the original question, which was, can machines make
creative choices and generate the originality required to obtain copyright
protection? The answer to that question is, in this Article’s view, negative, and
it remains so here. In sum, any doctrinal point based on the derivation by
machines based on preexisting works is misguided if used to justify copyright
protection in derivative productions.236
VI. THE PATH FORWARD
A. HUMANS AS CAUSE
As discussed above, the binary paradigm according to which machines
are either mere tools in the hands of human users or generators of either
random output (therefore, non-original, as it does not result from creative
choices) or entirely pre-programmed (as in the videogame audiovisual output
example) is obsolete. Machines are capable of autonomous decision-making.
The question to ask is, when do they reach the threshold of autonomy that
separates or delinks their productions from the humans that programmed or
used them?
Characteristics of autonomy include (1) the ability make independent
decisions or draw conclusions (2) derived from information gathered by the
decision-maker.237 AI machines can process “big data” corpora of literary and
artistic works, for example, and produce their “own” art.238
Once the autonomy threshold has been crossed and a determination
made that it is the machine that is making the relevant choices, two possible
legal conclusions can be drawn. First, one might conclude that, because “all
creativity is inherently algorithmic” and machines are, therefore creative,
autonomous machine productions are protected by copyright.239 Logically it
can be expected that industries that increasingly rely on machines to “assist”
in the creative process will adamantly defend this view. The next step, if that

234. See Tal Vigderson, Hamlet II: The Sequel? The Rights of Authors vs. Computer-Generated “ReadAlike” Works, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401, 428 (1994) (“It is likely that Congress did not intend for
computer-generated works to be protected as derivative works.”).
235. Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 209, 217 (1983).
236. A related question is whether courts will be more lenient in allowing the machines to
make “fair uses” of pre-existing works (which they would need to copy). This is a point that this
Article need not belabor. For a discussion, see generally Grimmelmann, supra note 55.
237. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1837, 1840–43, 1863–71, 1894–1901 (2015) (discussing autonomy in the context of AI
systems used in combat and war).
238. See supra notes 5–7.
239. See Bridy, Coding, supra note 3, at 2; Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 8, at 682–89.

A3_GERVAIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

THE MACHINE AS AUTHOR

7/19/2020 8:40 AM

2099

path is chosen, is the search for the human proxy author, because the title in
the work must vest in someone.240 This Article argues the opposite, namely that
machines that make decisions and cross the autonomy threshold produce
public domain material to which no copyright rights attach.241
This Article’s suggestion is that a court deciding whether the autonomy
threshold has been crossed should do what courts are often doing in other
contexts and look for causation, and in this case specifically, the causation of
originality.242 Here, this means identifying the cause of the choices that “look
like” they might be creative and thus generative of originality.
To draw an analogy with product liability law, the type of causation
required is specific to the work at hand, not general.243 The question, in other
words, is not whether a particular AI machine can generally cause creative
“look-alikes” to be produced, but rather whether it caused the choices that
make a specific production look like an original work of authorship. If choices
embedded in the machine’s output are those of human programmers or users
and otherwise meet the Feist requirements (e.g., that they not be functional),
then the choices are creative and the production is protected (at least in part
as this Article explains below). If not, the production is beyond the autonomy
threshold and the choices are not creative from the perspective of copyright
law.244 Autonomous and ultimately unpredictable choices (even if some sort
of broad “range” of predictability can be established) made by the machine, in
other words, do not cause or generate the type of originality required to
obtain copyright protection.

240. See supra Section III.B.
241. Machines also interact with humans. Humans program at least the initial AI code. See
Grothaus, supra note 10. Humans also provide the data or point to the sources of data from which
the machine is to learn. See Grossfeld, supra note 21. A series of users might interact with the
machine in a variety of ways, to obtain information or help in decision-making, as tools to
implement decisions, or by granting machines a much larger degree of autonomy. Take for
example the AI systems that algorithmically filter content uploaded to YouTube using the
ContentID system, which has the unenviable task of detecting copyright infringements in an area
where fair use borders remain murky. See Emily Tate, YouTube’s ContentID Copyright Infringement
Flagging System: Using Its Corporate-Assuaging Origins in Viacom v. YouTube as a Jumping-Off Point
for the Way It’s Been Used and Altered Over the Years, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 2 (2017)
(discussing the operation of the ContentID system).
242. For example, in criminal law. See Carl-Friedrich Stuckenberg, Causation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 468, 471 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014). And,
of course, tort law. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share
Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 452 (2006) (discussing “the fundamental tort principle of causation”).
243. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (1993) (discussing and comparing specific and general causation).
244. It is also conceivable that the choices would be caused not (just) by programmers but
by the human users of the machine.
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B. CREATIVE CHOICES AS WATERMARKS OF ORIGINALITY
How does one establish originality causation? The test suggested in this
Article allows a separation of the protectible creative expression of humans
from the nonprotectible expression contained in machine productions. This
Article suggests applying the test to distinguish cases where the programmer
or user is the author of (at least part of) a production, and those where she is
not. The implementation of the suggested approach is to follow the creative
choices: Are the creative choices embedded in the code or the user’s
instructions directly reflected in the production (machine output), the
originality of which the court must decide upon?245 In the case of deep
learning AI systems, the productions of AI systems are very unlikely to be
predictably contained in the AI code or user’s instructions.246 This suggested
approach (following the creative choices) is not entirely novel: The
jurisprudence concerning derivative works might be useful as those cases tend
to consider (though rarely explicitly) whether the derivative author has
reused the creative choices of the underlying work.247
To proceed with the proposed test, a court would first have to eliminate
the situations covered in the “old” binary paradigm—namely those where the
computer is a mere tool and does not itself contribute expression—and cases
where the machine produces an output that results from nonrelevant (e.g.,
functional or random) choices.248 The cases targeted by this Article’s test are
those where facially copyright-relevant choices are made by the AI machine (i.e.,
those choices would generate originality but for the fact that their origin is a
machine). In application of the originality causation principle suggested
above, courts should identify machine-made choices and exclude them in
determining whether a production is original.249 If all or almost all of the
relevant choices were caused by a machine, the production is not protected
by copyright at all.250 If a work results from choices made both by human and

245. As with videogames, the audiovisual output of which is generally predictably embedded
in the code. See Cronin, supra note 65, at 26.
246. See Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial Intelligence Systems
Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215,
2220 (2018) (“AI advanced systems are becoming capable of creating unpredictable, innovative
outcomes independently, rather than merely by following digital orders.”).
247. See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. For example, a translation of a novel
may not contain a single word from the expression in the original language, but it reflects and
reuses most of the choices of the author of the original work (structure, flow, use of metaphors,
style, etc.). See Gulick, supra note 229, at 83 (discussing how a good translation requires reflecting
the author’s creative choices). A mashup, in contrast, reproduces elements from pre-existing
works and is derivative in that it reuses creative choices of the author of the works it copies. For
more discussion, see generally Pote, supra note 230.
248. An example of this would be the use of a randomized function to generate sequences
of words or numbers. See supra Section V.A.2.
249. See supra Section V.A.1.
250. See supra Section V.A.2.
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machine, that work should be treated as any other case where someone has
reused material from the public domain to create a new work: The public
domain material must be filtered out.251 Here, this means filtering out
material that results from machine-made choices.252 This is fully consonant
with the doctrine of joint authorship, according to which each coauthor must
have made a copyrightable contribution.253
C. LEGISLATION V. COMMON LAW
Should courts do (all) the work, or should the statute be amended?
Let us posit, first, that if a national law refers to humans as the origin of
works protected by the statute, this is likely to guide a court’s hand in the
event of a dispute even if the statement was not made with AI machines in
mind.254
A number of national legislators have taken the bull more directly by its
doctrinal and normative horns, however, and legislated humanness in or out
of authorship in respect of computer-generated (though not specifically AIproduced) works. In 1988, the United Kingdom introduced a definition
of the term “computer-generated” in its Copyright Act and defined it as
follows: “[I]n relation to a work, [computer-generated] means that the work
is generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human
author of the work.”255 The British Act then provides that the author of such

251. If a work results from choices made by human and machine, this should be treated as
any other case where someone has reused a work in the public domain: The public domain
material must be filtered out from the Plaintiff’s work. This happens regularly in cases involving
computer code, for example. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 837
(10th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n determining copyright infringement, a court must filter out all unoriginal
elements of a program, including those elements that are found in the public domain.”).
252. As courts have been able to filter out public domain material reused to create new works,
the purported advantage of “eliminat[ing] the necessity of pursuing an elusive distinction
between computer-assisted and computer-generated works” seems quite limited. Denicola, supra
note 5, at 284.
253. See, e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v.
Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068
–69 (7th Cir. 1994); see also M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493
(11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting claim of co-authorship because, inter alia, architectural work client
contributed only uncopyrightable ideas).
254. Many European national laws refer to “works of the mind” (or “spirit”), which one can
assume refers to the human mind (or spirit). See e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE
[IPC] [Intellectual Property Code] art. L111-1 (Fr.). Very few national laws that this Article has
been able to identify mention human authorship directly. Lebanese law contains a rare example
of legislative drafting that might have this effect. Law 75 of 3 Apr. 1999 (Law on the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Property) (Leb.) (“The protection of this Law shall apply to every
production of the human spirit . . . .” (emphasis added)).
255. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 178 (UK); see also Dana S. Rao, Note,
Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An Examination of Available Intellectual Property
Protection for Neural Networks in Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509,
538 (1997) (observing that “[t]he U.K.’s copyright law offers protection for computer-generated
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a work “shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary
for the creation of the work are undertaken”256 and that “copyright expires at
the end of the period of 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which
the work was made.”257 The Irish Copyright Act is to the same effect as the
U.K. statute.258 This position seems at odds with EU copyright law, which
ostensibly requires human authorship.259 Australia’s courts and its Copyright
Law Review Committee see things differently.260 Indeed, its Copyright Act
refers to protection of works “of which the author . . . [is] a qualified person.”261
Excluding machine productions wholesale from copyrightable subject
matter by changing the text of the statute would solve the cases where the
machine is the sole producer. Courts would still have to parse cases where a
machine and a human produce jointly, and cases where the creative choices
of the programmer (or possibly those of the user) are embedded in what
seems to be a machine production in such a way that originality causation can
be traced back to humans (the “follow the creative choices” test proposed
above).262
This Article takes the view that a statutory exclusion of machine
productions is unnecessary and that courts, on a proper analysis of the current
statute, should exclude them by applying the normative or (more likely) the
doctrinal arguments considered in Parts IV and V, or both.
D. APPLICATIONS
In this last Section, the proposed principles and resulting tests are
applied to illustrate their practical impact.

works” and that this protection would apply to the production of neural networks and inhere to
the “inventor” of the network in question).
256. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, c. 48, § 9(3) (UK).
257. Id. § 12(7).
258. Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2008), § 2 (Ir.), http://
www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2000/act/28/section/2/enacted/en/html#sec2 [https://perma.cc/
4GHG-UKBZ]. For a discussion, see Paul Lambert, Computer-Generated Works and Copyright: Selfies,
Traps, Robots, AI And Machine Learning, 39(1) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 12, 17–18 (2017).
259. See Julia Dickenson et al., Creative Machines: Ownership of Copyright in Content Created by
Artificial Intelligence Applications, 39(8) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 457, 460 (2017) (“[U]nder
current EU law there is likely to be little or no copyright protection afforded to AIgenerated/created works and so additional national law provisions (such as those existing in the
CPDA in UK) come into play.”).
260. See Sam Ricketson, The Need for Human Authorship—Australian Developments: Telstra Corp
Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd, 34 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 54, 54 (2012) (“[I]n the case of
original literary works, it is necessary for a successful plaintiff to identify the specific works for
which protection is claimed, and the human authors of those works.”); see also Alexandra George,
Reforming Australia’s Copyright Law: An Opportunity to Address the Issues of Authorship and Originality,
37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 939, 941 (2014).
261. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 32(1) (Austl.) (emphasis added).
262. See supra Section VI.B.
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1. Computer-Created Productions
The scenario that is most likely, in this Article’s view, to land on a court’s
docket, is one in which protection by copyright of music, news releases, or
other texts or images produced by an AI machine is asserted by a plaintiff.263
Those productions “look like” copyrightable subject matter in that they will
seem to be original and the product of creative choices.264
Because many current productions of AI machines are relatively low on
the creativity ladder, a plaintiff would likely begin by arguing that the
creativity threshold is low.265 This is correct, but this Article’s suggestion is to
avoid modifying the threshold by dissecting the exact nature of creativity.
Instead, this Article suggests looking at the causation of the choices to see if
they are creative under Feist. If the cause is the machine, then the choices,
though they may appear creative (and indeed may well be “creative” in the
vernacular), do not qualify for copyright protection.
In application of the test proposed in this Article (originality causation)
and its implementation through the identification of creative choices, the task
of a court would be to determine whether the choices that caused the
apparent originality were embedded in (human-written) code in a way that
the output was “caused” by the program, as in cases applying copyright
protection to the output of audiovisual games.266 Choices too far removed
from the code or the user’s instructions, that is, those made autonomously by
the machine, do not count toward copyright protection. This is the barrier
that this Article terms the autonomy threshold.267
2. AI Photography
Photography is a quintessential type of creation when it comes to
originality. The photographer’s choices, such as those in the famous portrait
of Oscar Wilde that made its way to the Supreme Court, include pose, light,
and shade.268 How would the analysis above apply to photographs taken by AIequipped drones and other cameras?

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
As those were defined above. See supra Section V.B.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).

The third finding of facts says . . . “plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own
original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar
Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and
other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade” . . . . These findings,
we think, show this photograph to be an original work of art, the product of
plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author. . . .

A3_GERVAIS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2104

7/19/2020 8:40 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:2053

In a famous British case, the last known photograph taken by a security
camera of Diana, Princess of Wales, before her fatal car crash in Paris, was
denied copyright protection based on a rather novel public interest
defense.269 The case should have been decided on another, rather obvious
grounds, namely that no creative choices had been made, as Judge Kaplan did
(using both British and U.S. law) in a case involving photographs of old
masters’ paintings.270 The camera had no autonomy and the angle and
location were likely chosen for functional (security-related) considerations.
This reasoning can be applied to AI machines. Drones and other AIcapable systems can, in contrast to fixed security cameras, make autonomous
or semi-autonomous decisions.271 Even basic digital cameras in “automatic”
mode make most of the decisions other than where to point and shoot.272
Dark room “choices” are no longer being made, as pictures are stored as
digital files and printed on normal printers.273 In keeping with the test
proposed in this Article (originality causation), only photographs with
sufficient, demonstrable human creative choices directly influencing how the
picture is taken matter in the determination of originality and, hence, the
existence of copyright protection.
That said, one must take caution in distinguishing a temporal gap from
an absence of human creative choices. A photographer can make the type of
choices necessary to generate originality but add a delay (or program the

Id.; see Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 66, at 356–58; Eva E. Subotnik, The Author Was Not an
Author: The Copyright Interests of Photographic Subjects from Wilde to Garcia, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
449, 449–52 (2016).
269. Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. Yelland [2000] RPC 604 at 626 (Eng.).
270. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 426–27, 427 n.47
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); see Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); see also Wojcik, supra note 198, at 261 (“[T]he court explicitly held that a change in
medium alone would not confer sufficient originality to entitle a work to copyright protection.”).
271. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next
Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1141 (2013) (“The drones of
tomorrow are expected to leap from automation to ‘autonomy.’ Tomorrow’s sophisticated
machines will have the ability to execute missions without guidance from a human operator.”);
see also Ravid & Liu, supra note 246, at 2223.
272. See William W. Fisher III et al., Reflections on the Hope Poster Case, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
243, 320 (2012) (“[S]napshots—conventional representations of conventional subjects, made
using digital cameras with ‘fully automatic’ settings—might on this basis be deemed parts of the
public domain.”).
273. The same can now be said of three-dimensional printers. See Haritha Dasari, Note,
Assessing Copyright Protection and Infringement Issues Involved with 3d Printing and Scanning, 41 AIPLA
Q.J. 279, 299 (2013) (“Some software programs are almost entirely automated and do not
require the user to participate in the actual scanning process once the target object has been
placed in position. Others allow designers to use digital cameras to take a series of pictures that
the software then reconstructs into a 3D model. Some of these scanners also require or permit
an individual to manually assist in the digitization process. The less amount of human input
involved in the model, the less likely it is that the object will meet the requisite amount of
originality to be copyrightable.”).
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camera to take multiple pictures at a certain time interval) without breaking
the originality causation link. It is not the time factor, in other words, but
rather the autonomy of the machine that controls.
3. AI-Aided (“Joint”) Works
As noted earlier, the binary paradigm—according to which a machine is
either a mere tool in the hands of the user, or produces outputs that were
either predictably programmed into the machine or are random outputs in
which no originality (as the term is defined in copyright law) is embedded
—must be jettisoned.274 AI machines can make decisions, thus choices, and
those choices may appear to be creative.275 The task of courts is to parse and
exclude the machine’s contribution(s).
To do so, the proposed originality causation test should be applied.
Creative choices embedded in a production in which copyright rights are
claimed should be identified and their causation determined. Parsing the
source of creative choices is not new. Courts have done so repeatedly in
deciding whether authors of a work are joint authors, which includes a
determination that each author has made a copyrightable (though not
necessarily self-standing) contribution.276 The contributions need not be
equal, either qualitatively or quantitatively.277 An important indicium that a
person is an author is the “contributor’s decisionmaking authority over what
changes are made and what is included in a work.”278 Finally, a contribution
must be more than “de minimis” to qualify for copyright protection.279
VII. CONCLUSION
Algorithms can create material that seems to qualify as copyrightable
subject matter. This Article reviewed the doctrinal and normative arguments
that might justify granting copyright protection to those “machine
productions” and arguments against granting such protection. The Article
274. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
276. Courts will not recognize someone who made a non-copyrightable contribution (such
as ideas or mere suggestions) as a joint author. See supra note 253. For a very interesting and
thorough discussion of the application of the notion of joint author to productions made in
whole or in part by AI machines, see Ginsburg & Budiardjo, supra note 66, at 417–33; and Yu,
supra note 34, at 1266.
277. Greene v. Ablon, 794 F.3d 133, 151 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[A][1] (2014)); Brownstein v. Lindsay, 742 F.3d
55, 64–65 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 6.03); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 505.2 (3d ed. 2017), available at https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2RB2-4J84] (noting that someone “may be considered a joint author, even if
his or her contribution to the work is smaller or less significant than the contributions made by
another author”).
278. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202–03 (2d Cir. 1998).
279. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069–70 (7th Cir. 1994).
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rejected arguments in favor of protection of machine productions by
copyright for several reasons, not the least of which is that machines need no
legal or financial incentives to run their code.
Reviewing the history and normative basis for copyright law, this Article
demonstrates that copyright is meant to promote human creativity and that
creating incentives to have more productions in the literary and artistic field
made by machines could in fact pose a threat to (human) progress. Machine
productions should also be denied copyright because machines cannot be
held liable for their work, and copyright (as in a right in one’s work) and
responsibility for that work historically have gone hand in hand. In short, the
law should not protect machine productions.
Copyright doctrine is similarly refractory to the protection of nonhuman
productions. First among the doctrinal arguments is that machines cannot
make the creative choices that are required to generate originality, and
originality is a sine qua non of copyright. In short, current law does not protect
machine productions.
To allow courts to apply the law as it is, and should be, this Article
proposed a test known as originality causation. The test calls for a
determination of the cause of the creative choices that make a production
seem copyrightable. Causation is a well-known test in several areas of law;
following creative choices is currently used to determine whether a work is
derivative. This requires going beyond the old paradigm according to which
machines are seen as mere tools in the hands of a human user, or producing
outputs that are either preprogrammed by human programmers, or random
and thus devoid of originality. AI machines can make choices and decisions,
and thus cross what this Article refers to as the autonomy threshold.
Productions made past that threshold are too far removed from the human
programmer, owner, or user for the law to consider the programmer, owner,
or user as author of the production. This means that, if all or almost all the
choices embedded in a literary or artistic production are those of a machine,
that production is not protected by copyright. If the choices were made by
human and machine, the machine-produced choices must be filtered out, as
courts do in the case of works that reuse public domain materials, for
example.
We will all read, watch, and listen to more and more machine
productions. This impacts the future in several ways, including for
professional creators, and for all of us who rely on journalists and artists to
understand our world, and engage with it as informed and educated members
of a polity. There will no doubt be advantages to having machine productions
in certain contexts, but it is humans who will lead humans towards progress.
That much is certain, as is the fact that copyright law, as the Constitution
directs, should promote, not hinder, human progress.

